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ABSTRACT 
Colonel Edward D. Churchill’s role as the Chief Surgical Consultant in the 
Mediterranean Theater of the Second World War brought about major changes to the 
standards of wound care for all soldiers in the theater.  Churchill toured the theater noting 
the major discrepancies and problems in the medical care of wounded soldiers.  
Following this tour, Churchill set out to implement higher standards of wound care 
throughout the theater.   
Churchill vehemently worked with whole blood use, implementation of an 
organized evacuation route, and proper surgical techniques.   Civilian doctors who made 
up the U.S. Army Medical Corps as well as medical misinformation caused many of the 
problems in these three areas.  Churchill’s implementation of whole blood use ended the 
excessive use of plasma, a whole blood substitute, raising the survival rate of the 
wounded soldiers.  Implementation of proper surgical techniques ensured the end of the 
overuse of sulfonamides, an antibacterial drug, which the military surgeons frequently 
used in the place of surgery.  Lastly, Churchill organized the medical evacuation route 
from the front lines to the zone of communication which guaranteed that the wounded 
soldiers received surgical care in a timely and appropriate manner increasing the survival 
rate of the casualties.   
These lessons extended far beyond the Mediterranean Theater to help casualties in 
the Pacific and European Theaters making Churchill’s incites invaluable.   
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Chapter I 
PROLOGUE 
 Edward Delos Churchill, Harvard medical professor and head of surgical services 
at Massachusetts General Hospital, began his wartime service on 6 March 1943 as the 
Chief Surgical Consultant of the Mediterranean Theater. His arrival in Algiers began a 
two-year tour of service that took him to Tunisia, Algeria, Sicily, and Italy.  The Surgical 
Consultant position required him to travel long distances to various medical installations 
in order to assess the quality of surgery and surgical problems.  The tours across North 
Africa revealed much to Churchill about the need for accurate medical knowledge in the 
fields of surgical wound management and whole blood transfusions.  The knowledge 
gained from these tours shaped the last days of the North African Campaign and defined 
how physicians cared for the wounded in Sicily and Italy.   
 Churchill used his first tour across Tunisia as an observational trip to gather 
information about the British and American medical installations in Tunisia.  Churchill’s 
first tour across Tunisia began on 15 March 1943.  On 16 March 1943, Churchill visited 
the British 31st General Hospital at Oved Athmena, Tunisia, which afforded him a closer 
look at the British installation which so much of the early American medical procedures 
were based upon.  He moved on to Meskiana to the 77th Evacuation Hospital, a 750-bed 
institution run by a medical group from the University of Kansas.  Later on 17-18 March 
1943 he moved down to the 9th Evacuation Hospital at Youks le Bains, Tunisia and then 
on to the 48th Surgical Hospital at Bou Chebka. He also stopped in at the 18th Casualty 
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Clearing Station and 25th Field Surgical Unit on 20 March before returning to Algiers on 
23 March 1943.   
Seven days later, Churchill began a second tour of hospitals across Tunisia with 
Jim Forsee, the commanding officer of the 2nd Auxiliary Surgical Group who was in 
search of his scattered medical teams across Tunisia.  After observing the British 31st 
General Hospital on 5 April, Churchill and Forsee moved on to the 48th Surgical 
Hospital.  Churchill began to take note of surgical discrepancies, especially problems 
with the transfusion of blood plasma.  For example, Churchill observed a wounded 
soldier experiencing chills because of the plasma infusions.  The medical staff at the 48th 
Surgical Hospital informed Churchill that when the wounded did not show signs of 
shock, they were infused with 250 ccs of plasma.  Physicians infused patients with more 
than 500 ccs in an hour when they demonstrated signs of shock.  Situations such as this at 
the 48th demonstrated to Churchill the need for whole blood transfusions.  Churchill 
stated that “The problems calling for expert surgical judgment seen at the 48th Surgical 
Hospital surpassed in difficulty any that I had encountered previously in surgery.”1  On 6 
April, he and Forsee travelled to the 77th Evacuation Hospital near Tebessa where 
Churchill noted the widespread problems with plasma and whole blood transfusions.  
Here, the staff performed eight to nine whole blood transfusions per week using their 
own men as donors.  However, getting the men to donate proved difficult as they often 
refused because they may need the blood if they were later wounded.  Here, Churchill 
encountered problems with sulfonamides and the damage they could cause to patients.  
He observed a patient treated with sulfonamides immediately after wounding and 
                                                            
1 Edward D. Churchill, MD, Surgeon to Soldiers: Diary and Records of the Surgical Consultant, Allied 
Force Headquarters, World War II (Philidelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1972), 159. 
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continued to receive sulfonamide treatments until he reached the 77th Evacuation 
Hospital, where he arrived with a high fever and infection.  However, once physicians 
cleaned the wound of all fragments, the wound healed negating the need for further 
sulfonamide treatment.  Observing this patient led Churchill to believe that sulfonamides 
did more harm to the casualties than help.  
 On 9 April, the pair moved on to the 9th and 38th Evacuation Hospital as well as 
the 94th British Evacuation Hospital on the outskirts of Algiers.  At the 94th Evacuation 
Hospital, Churchill observed British secondary sutures and the success of the surgical 
technique.  In this procedure, surgeons at forward hospitals opened the wounds and 
removed all foreign materials.  They then bandaged the wound and after a period of rest 
sent the casualty to the base hospitals such as the 94th Evacuation Hospital.  Once here, 
the surgeons examined the wound once more for signs of infection before closing the 
wound.  Such procedures allowed surgeons to be sure that no foreign materials or dead 
tissue were left in the wound before closing the wound for good.  However, as Churchill 
later found out, implementing this radical surgical technique would prove difficult.   
After returning to Algiers, Churchill again left on a third tour on 20 April, which 
encompassed the American Base Hospitals.  On 20 April, he reached the 12th General 
Hospital at Oran where he observed wound management techniques.  The story of a 
sulfonamide rash particularly interested Churchill.  The young soldier in question had 
been the victim of a gasoline fire near his base in Rabat and was evacuated immediately 
following the accident.  The soldier passed through several hospitals over the next nine 
days and each treated him with large amounts of locally applied sulfonamides.  On 17 
March, the casualty was found to have contracted a severe rash.  The soldier reached the 
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38th Evacuation Hospital on 20 March where the physicians immediately stopped the 
sulfonamide treatments and the rash cleared.  However, when the soldier was evacuated 
to the 12th General Hospital on 7 April, the sulfonamide treatments began again at which 
time the severe rash returned.  The physicians stopped the sulfa treatments and the rash 
disappeared.  This encounter showed Churchill that the use of sulfonamides not only 
hindered the proper healing of wounds but could also cause allergic reactions.  
Churchill interviewed two of the surgeons while at the 12th General Hospital 
about their surgical techniques and stated that the surgeons were too set in their ways to 
experiment with new wound closure techniques such as secondary wound closures.  As 
he traveled on to the 21st General Hospital at Bou Hanifa on 27 April, Churchill again 
found problems with the unwillingness to accept new wound closure techniques.  Here he 
met Major Wendell S. Dove, the Chief of the Section of Septic Surgery.  Dove actively 
performed secondary sutures that so shocked the traditional surgeons that steps were 
underway to forbid Dove from this procedure.  Churchill further shocked the traditional 
surgeons at the 21st General Hospital by spending his time observing Dove’s performance 
of secondary sutures instead of with the old-fashioned surgeons.  Churchill saw great 
potential in this procedure and would later install it as the preferred method of wound 
closure in the Mediterranean Theater.   
The situations he encountered during these tours in Tunisia and Algeria formed 
the medical opinions he had about the care of American casualties and how best to 
improve medical care.  Churchill used these experiences to establish firm rules about 
whole blood transfusions, proper surgical techniques, as well as medical evacuation of 
 
 
5 
 
casualties that drastically changed how the physicians took care of the wounded as the 
Army moved from North Africa into Sicily and Italy.   
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Chapter II 
INTRODUCTION 
Colonel Edward Churchill, acclaimed Harvard Surgical Professor and renowned 
American surgical pioneer, became one of the most important assets to the Army Medical 
Department in the Mediterranean Theater of the World War II.  His innovative thinking 
and bold surgical actions helped implement lifesaving practices that transcended the 
Mediterranean Theater to affect the whole of the Armed Services Medical Departments.  
His service focused on three areas: use of whole blood on the battlefield, accurate timing 
of surgery as well as proper surgical techniques, and organization of a medical evacuation 
route.  The case of whole blood particularly shows how the Army Medical Corps was not 
prepared to enter the war.  The Army had not made preparations for whole blood 
transfusions on the field and instead relied on plasma, a blood substitute.  Churchill’s 
investigations showed that there could be no substitute for blood and helped make whole 
blood transfusions in the battlefield a reality.  He also helped establish a proper timeline 
for surgery whereas before surgery occurred in a hodgepodge manner leaving the 
wounded unable to fight infections and unable to heal properly.  Thus, his reforms to 
surgical techniques streamlined procedures and provided the wounded a better chance to 
heal by setting up proper surgical techniques and requiring the removal of all dead tissues 
from the wounds, allowing casualties a chance to heal.  Lastly, Churchill organized 
medical evacuation that set up the evacuation chain in stages and assigned each of the 
hospitals in the chain different tasks, allowing the casualties the best surgical care 
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possible.  Edward Churchill’s work in these fields especially that of blood transfusion, 
transformed the medical care in all theaters of the World War II, providing better medical 
care that saved countless numbers of lives.   
 Edward Delos Churchill was born in 1895 in Chenoa, Illinois and entered 
Northwestern University in 1916 where he obtained a Bachelor of Science degree.  He 
later attended the Harvard Medical School and graduated in 1920.  Following graduation, 
Churchill began a two-year internship followed by two a two-year residency at 
Massachusetts General Hospital.  Churchill was awarded the Moseley Traveling 
Fellowship in 1926 and spent a year traveling abroad in Europe working and training 
under the best surgeons in Europe.  Upon his return to Massachusetts General Hospital, 
Churchill was given his own laboratory where he explored problems of pulmonary 
disease and the concept of shock.  In the years that followed, he continued to make many 
meaningful contributions to the field of medicine, including performing the first 
successful pericardiectomy for chronic constrictive pericarditis, an inflammation of the 
membrane sac around the heart.  In 1928, he headed up the first academic surgical unit at 
Boston City Hospital.  Churchill later returned to Massachusetts General Hospital in 1933 
where he was designated by the Harvard Medical School as the John Homans Professor 
of Surgery as well as the Chief of Surgical Services.  It was during the years that 
followed, as Francis Moore states, that “…Dr. Churchill carried our most of the work that 
the surgical world later regarded as his major clinical contributions.”1 These works 
included hyperparathyroidism operations, pneumonectomies, among many other 
pioneering surgeries.   
                                                            
1 Francis D. Moore, MD, “Edward Delos Churchill, 1895-1972,”  Annals of Surgery (1973): 508. 
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 Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the Army 
Medical Corps drafted surgeons to join the infantry troops in Europe and North Africa.  
Many hospitals, including Massachusetts General Hospital, and many other medical 
institutions activated their own units.  The director of Massachusetts General deemed 
Churchill an essential member of the hospital’s operation, giving him a reprieve from 
service in the Army Medical Corp, as he held a position as a surgical professor and 
served as the head of the surgical unit at Massachusetts General.  However, Churchill’s 
guilt for not participating in the World War I resulted in his volunteering for service in 
the Army Medical Corps.  During the World War I, Churchill attended medical school 
and thus did not join in the war.  The social pressure for not volunteering for service in 
the war left Churchill with a sense of regret that he had not performed his duty as an 
American.  As he saw the hospital’s young men prepare for the World War II, he joined 
the effort.  Churchill stated that “Young men who are not on active service are exposed to 
intense emotional pressure.”2  He felt that after the war, Massachusetts General Hospital 
would split in two between those who served in the war and those who had not.  Thus, his 
sense of duty compelled him to join the Army Medical Corps.  Later that year, in 
December 1942, the Army made him a colonel in the Army Medical Corps and appointed 
him the Chief Surgical Consultant of the Mediterranean Theater of War.   
The Army Medical Corps that Churchill entered was still recovering from the 
rapid and detrimental changes following the Great War.  Mary C. Gillett, author of The 
Army Medical Department, 1917-1941, states that “…changes in the medical department 
like those in the army as a whole resulted from the demobilization and the resultant effort 
                                                            
2 Edward D. Churchill, MD, Surgeon to Soldiers: Diary and Records of the Surgical Consultant, Allied 
Force Headquarters, World War II (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1972), 27. 
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to restructure the nation’s defenses.  They also represented a growing apathy towards all 
things military.”3 The National Defense Act of 4 June 1920 set these major changes in 
motion.  This act capped the number of regulars in the US Army at 280,000 along with a 
severe restriction of funds.4  However, the Medical Corps also went through some 
positive changes as well, such as the push to standardize all the medical equipment the 
Army received through its various suppliers.  The Medical Corps also began to plan for a 
future war when many other dismissed the thoughts of war all together.   
 Throughout the 1920s, Congress continued to cut personnel and the budget for the 
Army Medical Corps even though the physicians in the Medical Corps could not keep up 
with the mounting volume of work placed on them because of the lack of help.  In some 
cases, the Army even resorted to a system of circuit specialist who travelled to the 
various installations seeing patients because there simple were not enough physicians.  
The Medical Corps also experienced many resignations during this time as physicians left 
the army in search of better pay in the civilian sector.  It seemed that the Army Medical 
Corps had reached a new low.  Surgeon General Merritte W. Ireland stated in 1931 that 
“The Medical Department is less well prepared for field service than [it] was before the 
war with Germany.”5   
 The situation did not improve during the 1930s as the Depression brought more 
budget cuts as well as the looming possibility of another war.   As a result, “They [the 
Army Medical Corps] were unable either to train or to equip the number of medical 
personnel for treating the sick and wounded that would result from a full-scale conflict 
                                                            
3 Mary C. Gillett, The Army Medical Department, 1917-1941 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military 
History, 2009): 457. 
4 Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 385. 
5 The Army Medical Department, 1917-1941, 476. 
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fought by a modern army.”6  In preparation for the coming war, Congress did allow for 
an increase in officers but decreased the number of enlisted men to help these physicians, 
hindering the productiveness of the new physicians.  Such practices stopped the Army 
Medical Corps’s effectiveness as it could not create the base of physicians and enlisted 
personnel it needed.   
 However, when Poland fell to Germany in 1939, the United States geared up for 
war.  After the fall of Poland, the Army Medical Corps trained more men and inducted 
them into the army reserves until they were needed.  This process continued as more 
countries fell to Nazi Germany.  The United States was more prepared for this war than 
any other before, but still not enough for the magnitude of what it faced.  As for the 
Medical Corps, the 1940 Congress did not increase its numbers, but did allow the 
Medical Corps to keep the reservists for up to one year.  Though this helped, in the 
meantime the Medical Corps would run out of physicians by 1942.  However, Congress 
did approve 13,000 new positions later in 1942.  The Army continued to fight its problem 
by stepping up the training exercises at Carlisle, the home of the Army Medical Field 
School.  Here, the Army trained 500 officers and 100 enlisted men every month as well 
as created a refresher course, training an additional 500 Medical Corps members each 
month.7  The Medical Corps also opened three replacement centers that trained additional 
numbers of enlisted personnel.  Despite the crumbling of the Army Medical Corps 
following the World War I, the Corps continually worked hard to raise its numbers and 
train personnel for the war.  However, the confusion and magnitude of the war was 
impossible to prepare for, a fact that Churchill observed first hand.   
                                                            
6 Ibid, 507. 
7 Ibid, 550. 
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The inter-war years also saw great advances in the medical field.   Perhaps one of 
the greatest advances that would have a lasting impact on the war was the invention of an 
antiseptic that later was hailed as a “miracle drug”: the sulfonamides.  The sulfonamides 
began their transformation in 1927 when Gerhard Domagk, a German scientist with the 
I.G. Farbenindustrie, discovered the curative powers of the Prontosil dye.  Historian John 
E. Lesch recounts the story of how the sulfonamides began the era of the “miracle drugs” 
in his work, The First Miracle Drugs: How the Sulfa Drugs Transformed Medicine.8  
Lesch stated “In retrospect, it is clear that the introduction of Prontosil marked a turning 
point in the history of medicine.  As the first of the compounds called sulfonamides or, 
more familiarly, sulfa drugs, Prontosil initiated a revolution in the therapeutics and 
management of bacterial infections.”9   
Until this point, antibacterial drugs remained elusive and no more so than during 
the Great War.  Colonel A.W. Mayo-Robinson, a Consulting Surgeon in the Great War, 
stated in his article “Some Surgical Developments in Wound Treatment During the War,” 
“…the perfect antiseptic, which, while fatal to germ life, is not injurious to the living 
cells in the wound has yet to be discovered.”10 However, in the decade after 1927 
developments in sulfonamides led to many derivatives and more “miraculous” healings, 
as the world had never seen such a drug that could fight off infections.  
The year following the discovery of sulfonamides, Alexander Fleming, a doctor 
working in London, discovered penicillin, destined to be a greater discovery than that of 
sulfonamides.  He made his greatest discovery in 1928 while studying the staphylococcus 
                                                            
8 John E. Lesch, The First Miracle Drugs: How the Sulfa Drugs Transformed Medicine (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007).    
9 Ibid, 3. 
10 Colonel A.W. Mayo-Robinson, “Some Surgical Developments in Wound Treatment During the War,” 
The British Medical Journal (1918): 2. 
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bacteria penicillium notatum.  This accidental discovery happened after he and his 
laboratory assistants placed several petri dishes with staphylococcus samples on a 
laboratory bench exposed to the open air.  The resulting contamination from various 
particles led to a mold growth that decimated the staphylococcus bacteria.  Further testing 
showed that penicillin, the name Fleming gave his discovery, even in small doses had a 
strong effect on a wide variety of bacteria.  The mold derivatives had few adverse effects 
on the host while it destroyed the infections unlike many of the antibacterial substances.  
Despite the fact that penicillin showed the most promising effect against bacteria, it 
would not be developed on a mass scale until near the end of the World War II as the 
process to do so eluded scientist until the mid-1940s.  
Advancements in whole blood also progressed in the inter-war years as well.  The 
Great War prompted many great discoveries in whole blood use especially in the 
problems with hemorrhage.  In a 1918 article, “Blood Volume in Wounded Soldiers: 
Blood Volume and Related Blood Changes after Hemorrhage,” Oswald Robertson and 
Arlie Bock point out the fact that hemorrhaging leads to a reduction in “…the total blood 
bulk.”11  They also posed that the appropriate method to determine how much blood had 
been lost in hemorrhage could be determined by a diminishing blood volume, but also 
state that this method was not always accurate.  Most importantly, the authors declare that 
“…the degree of increased blood production seemed to depend largely on the restoration 
of the blood volume.”12  
                                                            
11 Oswald H. Robertson, MD and Arlie V. Bock, MD, “Blood Volume in Wounded Soldiers: Blood 
Volume and Related Blood Changes After Hemorrhage,” Journal of Experimental Medicine 29 (1919), 
140. 
12 Ibid, 153. 
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J. Douglas Robertson corroborated this story in 1935 when he also stated that 
blood pressure is not an accurate determination of how much blood was lost during 
hemorrhaging.  Robertson also showed that during his experiments with hemorrhaging 
cats, he found that much of the fluid escaped into the tissues accounting for some of the 
loss of blood.  These findings on whole blood and sulfonamides expanded medical 
knowledge, but the Medical Corps of the World War II still faced problems with whole 
blood and sulfonamides.   
 The historiography and written record of Churchill’s World War II experiences 
are thin, limited to his own writings.  While still serving in the Army Medical Corps, 
Churchill published “The Surgical Management of the Wounded at the Time of the Fall 
of Rome” in the Annals of Surgery in 1944.  Brigadier General Fred Rankin of the Army 
Medical Corps called this article “one of the finest dissertations on management of 
wounds which has been submitted through the office of the Surgeon General of the U.S. 
Army.”13  Churchill compares and contrasts the efforts of the Medical Corps upon first 
entering the theater and how that organization matured within a year, becoming skilled in 
the practices of military medicine.  In particular, he describes the medical improvements 
that he helped bring about.  These include the three phases of wound care, blood 
transfusion, the excision of devitalized tissues, and the proper use of chemotherapy as 
well as the various stages of the medical evacuation line.  Churchill notes that “It is a 
satisfaction to note the contrast between the present concept of wound management and 
the doctrines in vogue scarcely a year ago.”14 
                                                            
13 Colonel Edward D. Churchill, “Surgical Management of the Wounded at the Time of the Fall of Rome,” 
Annals of Surgery 120 (1944): 268. 
14 Ibid, 283. 
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 Following his return to Boston after the war, Churchill did not write specifically 
on his experiences in the war until 1972, but he frequently applied the lessons he learned 
during the war to civilian life.  In 1952, Churchill published “The Shock Frog,” in which 
he discusses the British and American understanding of the concept of shock.  During the 
war, Churchill, as later discussed, spent much of his time exploring shock and the various 
interpretations of the problem.  As this article points out, a consensus still had not been 
reached on shock, but, as he states, the British and Americans no longer needed to look 
for an overall answer to the problem, only fine tune their ideas.15   
 In a 1953 article, Panic in Disaster, Churchill describes how his work with the 
management of evacuees and wartime surgeries could have been applied to victims of the 
tornado that struck Worcester, Massachusetts, on 9 June 1953.  He describes how in the 
chaos, responders removed the casualties to the nearest hospital, swamping the facility 
with victims.  Instead, Churchill stated that the responders should have distributed the 
casualties in this situation similar to the Army’s method, taking the seriously wounded to 
the nearest hospital and moving the less seriously injured to facilities farther away.  He 
also compared the irregular wounds caused by the tornado’s debris to the wounds caused 
by shrapnel in the war and how the surgeons treating these victims could have benefited 
from wartime surgical knowledge thus giving wartime surgery a dual purpose.16   
 In 1972, Churchill published Surgeon to Soldiers: Diary and Records of the 
Surgical Consultant, Allied Force Headquarters, World War II, the only detailed account 
of his time in the Mediterranean Theater.  This detailed book describes Churchill’s work 
before the war as an integral part of his participation in the Army, such as the 
                                                            
15 Edward Delos Churchill, “The Shock Frog,” Annals of Surgery 135 (1952): 573-576. 
16 Edward Churchill, “Panic in Disaster,” Annals of Surgery 138 (1953): 935-936. 
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organization and treatment of the wounded at the Coconut Grove Fire in the heart of 
Boston in 1942 as well as the path he took to becoming the Chief Medical Consultant of 
the North African Theater in the Army Medical Corps.  He sets apart three chapters in his 
book that describe his most meaningful work in the theater: “Wound Shock and 
Transfusion,” “The New Sulfa Drug Era of Surgery,” and “The Army Learns about War,” 
a chapter in which he describes how he helped organize the medical evacuation of the 
wounded.  As the only full description of his time in the war, this account proves a most 
valuable source for Churchill and the concepts he developed that were applied to other 
theaters as well.17     
 From the time of his retirement to today, a number of articles and longer works 
have been written on Edward Churchill’s impact on the medical field, although relatively 
little has been prepared on his work during his service in World War II.  In Oliver Cope’s 
November 1963 forward to the Annals of Surgery on the occasion of Churchill’s 
retirement from the medical field, his work in the war receives a mere mention.18 Cope 
states that “His analysis of the problem of war wounds and his recommendations 
regarding management stands as a milestone in military surgery.”19  Similarly, Francis D. 
Moore’s lengthy obituary at the time of Churchill’s death in 1972, Edward Churchill, 
1895-1972, refrains from an in depth discussion of Churchill’s war service.20  Moore 
states that “His [Churchill’s] perception of the beacons of clinical reality in a sea of 
military dogma and surgical mythology, permitted him to make many innovations that 
                                                            
17Edward D. Churchill, MD,  Surgeon to Soldiers: Diary and Records of the Surgical Consultant, Allied 
Force Headquarters, World War II (Philidelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1972).  
18 Oliver Cope, MD “In Honor of Edward Churchill, Foreword,” Annals of Surgery 158 (1963): 731-793. 
19 Ibid, 734. 
20 Francis D. Moore, MD, “Edward Delos Churchill, 1895-1972,” Annals of Surgery 177 (1972),507-508. 
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improved the care of the American wounded man.”21  Cameron Wright’s article from 
January 2012 recognizes that even forty years after his death the medical community still 
looks to Edward Churchill for guidance and inspiration in surgical and medicinal matters.  
However, Wright does not go into depth on Churchill’s wartime work, but glances over it 
in a statement: “Churchill helped to institute the policy of adequate debridement and 
delayed primary closure of war wounds, early use of whole blood transfusions, 
establishment of regional blood banks, and the use of air evacuation of wounded 
soldiers.”22 
 Three authors have taken a lengthier and in-depth look at Churchill’s 
contributions to military medicine.  Albert E. Cowdrey, former branch chief of the U.S. 
Army Center of Military History, published Fighting for Life: American Military 
Medicine in World War II in 1994 chronicling the trials and successes of the U.S. Armed 
Forces Medical Corps during the World War II.  Within this work, Cowdrey briefly 
details Edward Churchill’s time in the Mediterranean and the impact that it had on 
military medicine.  Cowdrey describes Churchill’s evacuation plan by detailing Richard 
Tregaskis’, famed wartime journalist, removal from an Italian mountainside after an 
explosion left him with a cranial injury.  Tregaskis’, like many other soldiers in the 
Mediterranean, received lifesaving surgery quickly because of this structured system.  
Cowdrey further details Churchill’s hard won implementation of debridement as a 
standard surgical procedure as well as the replacement of plasma use with whole blood.  
However, Albert Cowdrey’s work focuses on the whole of the U.S. Medical Corps 
leaving only room for a brief though brilliant description of Churchill’s impact on the 
                                                            
21 Ibid, 508. 
22 Cameron Wright, MD, “Historical Perspectives of the American Association for Thoracic Surgery: 
Edward D. Churchill, 1895-1972,” The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery 143 (2012): 2. 
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Mediterranean.  He cannot capture the detail and full scale of Churchill’s impact in his 
short analysis of the surgical consultant.23   
Matthew D. Kunhle’s 2002 Honor’s Thesis, Learning from Experience: Surgical 
Management of Wounded Combatants by the United States Army Medical Department 
and Efforts of Surgical Consultant Edward Churchill in the North African-Mediterranean 
Theater of Operation during the Second World War, also seeks to explore the success of 
the medical department in the Mediterranean Theater and “…the particular role the 
Colonel Edward D. Churchill played in overseeing and advising surgical management of 
casualties.”24 Indeed, Kunhle does skim Churchill’s contributions in the theater, but 
without much depth simply identifying the major themes of Churchill’s work: organizing 
the chain of medical evacuation and the elimination of plasma as a blood substitute for 
whole blood transfusions.  This thesis also covers major events in army medicine from 
the Civil War to the eve of the World War II, a brief description of the Mediterranean 
Theater and the medical department’s work there, as well as how Churchill’s 
contributions helped medical care in the other theaters.  With so many broad themes, 
Kunhle did not cover Churchill’s war work in depth.   
 In 2010, doctors Jeremy W. Cannon and Josef E. Fischer, a former Churchill 
intern, wrote Edward D. Churchill as a Combat Consultant: Lessons for the Senior 
Visiting Surgeons and Today’s Military Medical Corps in which they cover Churchill’s 
                                                            
23 Albert E. Cowdrey, Fighting for Life: American Military Medicine in World War II (New York: The 
Frees Press, 1994). 
24 Matthew Kunhle,  Learning from Experience: Surgical Management of Wounded Combatants by the 
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major contributions to the medical field in the Mediterranean.25  Cannon and Fischer take 
these lessons further and apply them to today’s military and demonstrate how these 
lessons apply to today’s Medical Corps.  The authors state that “Churchill’s conduct as a 
consultant holds a number of object lessons which remain relevant for military surgeons 
today.  These lessons can also be used to make a strong case for continued collaboration 
between civilian surgical leaders and the military medical corps in preserving the lessons 
of the past and in guiding the military medical corps in the future.”26  Like Churchill, 
Cannon and Fischer realized that forgetting lessons of the past medical engagements in 
wars has become a major problem in wars.  They state that “Churchill’s experience 
vividly illustrates the difficulty of preserving past lessons learned for future generations 
of military surgeons.”27  Cannon and Fischer express that it is crucial to ensure that 
medical knowledge is available to all surgeons.  They further assert that Churchill 
demonstrated that great potential of a mentoring program between the senior civilian 
surgeons and inexperienced military surgeons.  In closing, the authors pose that “…the 
military medical community must leverage the experience and perspective of senior 
civilian surgeons to most effectively care for our wounded soldiers and to shape the 
military medical corps of the future.”28  
 These reports and articles show how over his career, Edward Churchill made 
many changes and improvements to the medical field.  However, most fail to record his 
work during the World War II.  While this may not figure as a major milestone in his 
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career, his service in the Mediterranean Theater drastically improved medical care in all 
theaters of the World War II and deserves to be considered.   
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Chapter III 
PLASMA AND BLOOD  
 Edward Churchill arrived at Allied Headquarters in the North African Theater on 
6 March 1943 with excitement and anticipation of the forthcoming action.  Churchill 
found the Army Medical Corps in dire straits as they lacked vital equipment and 
practiced medicine with antiquated knowledge that would be remedied in the war’s later 
years.  Churchill found this particularly true when it came to the treatment of shock.  His 
tours across the North African battlefields revealed a complete lack of life saving whole 
blood, which had been replaced by the ineffective plasma solution.   The war in the 
Mediterranean bore the brunt of the repercussions from the medical community’s 
ignorance of the usefulness of whole blood in the treatment of shock, a problem that 
Edward Churchill sought to remedy.   
One must first have the correct definition of shock and its causes to fully 
understand the journey that the medical community took when solving the surmounting 
shock crisis that transpired with the prodigious numbers of casualties.  Shock or 
circulatory shock is synonymous with hemorrhaging.  Blood can be lost through the 
surface wound and also through internal bleeding, which greatly compromises the body’s 
ability to circulate oxygen. This is termed hemodilution.  Without proper replacement of 
these oxygen carrying cells, the body becomes asphyxiated and dies.    
Though simply explained today, this definition took years of work in the field and 
in the laboratory, beginning in earnest in the First World War.  The work in this war 
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consisted of conjecturing the most effective shock treatments as no one knew what shock 
was much less a proper treatment.  Physicians of the Great War recognized “shock” as a 
problem without ever truly defining what the problem entailed.  As Churchill pointed out, 
the First World War recognized shock as a problem, but did not identify how it pertained 
to injuries sustained in battle. Physicians held a wide variety of ailments responsible for 
shock, such as increased carbon dioxide intake by the patient.  One doctor from 1908, 
attributed shock to acapnia and stated that shock was produced from over breathing. 
Shock virtually became attached to all that involved dying, a dubious definition that 
continued as a problem during the interwar years.   
Though the shock nomenclature crisis continued during the interwar years, vital 
knowledge began to emerge in the medical community which began to pinpoint shock on 
circulatory failure.  In 1930, scientist Eloise Parsons and Dallas B. Phemister stated that it 
was more correct to call shock hemorrhage or shock because of hemorrhage.  Blalock 
stated that shock was not a disease but peripheral circulatory failure.  In 1938, Virgil 
Holland Moon continued this look at circulatory failure by stating that shock was caused 
by circulatory deficiency because of a decrease blood volume.   
In 1941, the Medical Research Council (MRC), a British research institution, 
produced a thorough though flawed report on traumatic wound shock and blood 
transfusions.  The report stated that shock can come with any injury particularly those 
with mass hemorrhaging and tissue damage.  The report divided shock into two stages, an 
explanation that Churchill did not embrace, as he proved that shock was a continuous 
motion, never divided into two stages.  The report stated that the first stage consisted of 
primary shock, a collapse that could follow any injury, but particularly where hemorrhage 
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was present.  This stage resembled fainting and the patient became susceptible to outward 
stimulants such as the elements. Secondary wound shock followed sometime after the 
injury heralded by weakness and low blood pressure as its chief symptoms.  The Council 
pointed out that if blood loss exceeded 25 percent or more, the patient slipped into a state 
of “irreversible shock” and had little chance of recovery, another flawed conclusion.   
However, the Council did show the importance of whole blood in the recovery of shock 
patients.  The report stated that, “It is now generally accepted that the most important 
single requirement for arresting the progressive deterioration in general condition which 
is such a feature of shock is restoration of blood volume...”1 Though many accepted this 
theory, it was still not endorsed by the entire medical community.  
Churchill harshly critiqued these theories on shock and surmised that all the 
previous experiments on shock were conducted with a conclusion already in mind and 
performed solely to support the existing theories.  He also found fault with shock 
nomenclature, which continued as a problem in the Second World War.  Churchill stated 
that the definitions physicians applied to shock were too vague and many times used 
merely to state that someone was in the process of dying.  He stated this was especially 
true of the concept of irreversible shock.  He stated that “Although the diagnosis of 
‘irreversible shock’ appeared with some frequency on the clinical records in World War 
II, it was merely a pretentious way of indicating that the man had died of a lethal 
wound.”2  He concluded that all wound shock responded to treatment and irreversible 
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shock was merely a stage of shock difficult to treat, but not unresponsive to treatment.  
Therefore concepts such as “irreversible shock” could not exist.     
Churchill’s first wartime experience with shock and proper treatment came after 
he read the Medical Corps report on the wounded at the Pearl Harbor attack while 
working at the Army Field Medical School in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.  The doctors on 
duty during the crisis treated the injured with plasma, morphine, and warmth though the 
patients remained in shock despite their best efforts.  The naval hospital brought in large 
amounts of plasma, the liquid component of blood in which the red blood cells are 
suspended, from the civilian plasma bank in Honolulu.   Doctors then used the plasma on 
the scene and treated patients with it in order to reverse the effects of shock.  Treatment 
with plasma sprung out of the hypothesis that hemoconcentration was the root cause of 
shock.  Hemoconcentration occurs when large amounts of plasma are lost and the red 
blood cells are left with no way to travel through the body.  The doctors infuse large 
amounts of plasma in order to restore the pathway through the body.  Colonel Perrin H. 
Long, author of the Pearl Harbor report and a Johns Hopkins physician stated that “The 
hemoconcentration is already so great that the final withdrawal from the circulation of 
even small amounts of fluid may lead to catastrophe.” 3  Churchill later disputed the 
theory in the “Report on Shock from the Board of the Study of the Severely Wounded” in 
August 1943 and stated that mass injections of plasma merely served to further dilute the 
few remaining red blood cells in the body.4  Plasma raised the blood pressure for a short 
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amount of time but ultimately did nothing to solve the problem of oxygen distribution in 
the body.   
On 26 January 1943, Churchill visited the Walter Reed Hematology Laboratory in 
Washington, D.C., while he awaited his orders for North Africa and made notes on the 
transfusion technology he observed.  His interviews with the technicians in the laboratory 
revealed profound knowledge on the importance of blood and its importance to the war 
effort.  However, they felt ignored by those in higher command and entities such as the 
National Research Committee (ANRC) in favor of an easier, less effective solution.  The 
lab admitted that carrying blood into war theaters would be a cumbersome process, but 
worth the effort.  However, large amounts of plasma were ordered to the forward areas as 
well as a vast quantity in reserve, which meant between 250 to 500 ccs of plasma per 
casualty.5  Norman Kirk, the Surgeon General-elect at the time, later took the blame for 
not having the technology or the resources ready for the war.  He admitted that the 
medical community spent far too much effort on plasma.  Kirk stated that “a huge vested 
interest had been built up starting from assumptions and erroneous thinking.” 6  However, 
when one turned to battlefield observations, it can easily be seen as the source for the 
strong push for plasma. 
On the battlefield, the terrain and various difficult situations made obtaining 
whole blood with the methods and technology available in the early 1940s nearly 
impossible.  The Army Medical Corps solved this logistical problem with the overuse of 
blood plasma.  Plasma’s sanctioned use came from the highest authorities including the 
American National Research Council, which instituted and encouraged its use.  The 
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ANRC stated that the front was too far away from the whole blood supplies at the base 
hospital for such a solution to be possible.  The ANRC vowed to encourage the use of 
plasma until the war came closer to home where whole blood transfusions would be 
feasible.  Such a promise received little criticism as many in the medical community 
supported the hemoconcentration theory and those that disputed this fact were considered 
revolutionaries.  Secretly, many in the medical community did not want to look for 
another solution as plasma caused far fewer logistical problems than whole blood.  
Plasma seemed a miracle, a hype that the medical community encouraged while the 
problems were ignored.  Plasma could be administered without fear of reactions, did not 
have to be typed as whole blood, and could be dried immediately.  Another major factor 
can be attributed to the underestimation of the loss of blood (later termed as 
hemodilution) and blood seepage.   
In April 1941, the Subcommittee on Blood Substitutes of the National Research 
Council showed that plasma could be vacuum packed and stored for years without the 
need for refrigeration.  Once in the field, plasma could easily be reconstituted without the 
bulky equipment that would be required in whole blood transfusions.  Large quantities of 
plasma could be produced systematically and commercially in large quantities.  The ease 
of plasma production and use far overshadowed the problems that occurred on the 
battlefield from its use.     
 Preparations for such large quantities of plasma involved the cooperation of many 
groups, but the American Red Cross became the backbone of the program.  The 
American Red Cross already had the necessary experience while the ANRC and its 
subcommittees planned out the plasma program.  Previously, the Red Cross took on 
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several volunteer projects at the request of the Surgeon General and the Army that 
required work with large quantities of blood.  The New York chapter of the American 
Red Cross exemplified this role with the large part it played in the Blood for Britain 
Program in 1940.  In this program, the New York chapter partnered with the British 
Blood Transfusion program to provide large quantities of plasma for casualties in Britain 
and France.  The American Red Cross was more than ready to produce the plasma that 
the ANRC and Army Medical Corps deemed would be needed.  The American people 
showed up at donation sites all across America and gave blood donations to be turned 
into plasma.  Though this move was well intentioned, it was also ill-fated.   
 The Armed Forces had planned for plasma’s large scale use before American had 
even entered the war.  Medical leaders suggested that there should be 200,000 units of 
plasma on hand at all times before the attack on Pearl Harbor.7  These numbers 
dramatically increased following the disaster.  Many companies and organizations came 
together to provide all the plasma needed including the ANRC, the American Red Cross, 
commercial companies for mass production, among many others.  The use of whole 
blood as the cure for shock as physicians suggested before mass production of plasma 
seemed a distant memory with such a machine in place for the production of what was 
thought to be the panacea for shock.   
 Plasma use in the field would ease a major burden on the Armed Forces and was 
much simpler for all involved as plasma required little complicated equipment and could 
be administered, if need be, by those with little experience in plasma administration.  
Plasma had an indefinite shelf-life and could be dried and later reconstituted with ease in 
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the field.  Plasma also contained no red blood cells, which eliminated the need for blood 
typing, thus plasma could be produced commercially without restraint.  Understandably, 
in 1940 plasma seemed the only feasible solution to the resuscitation problem.  At the 
beginning of the war, whole blood could not have been administered even if physicians 
had deemed the substance the only solution to shock as the technology to mass package 
and administer whole blood did not yet exist.  This included preservation liquid, closed 
transfusion systems that kept the whole blood from contamination, as well as 
transportable refrigeration.  Even the most ardent whole blood supporters became 
discouraged.     
 Churchill saw the full magnitude of the plasma problem when he arrived in North 
Africa and toured the front lines and base hospitals of the II Corps in Tunisia.  Here, he 
was tasked with answering two questions: 1) Did the theater need whole blood when 
plasma was readily available?  2)  If they needed whole blood, how would it be obtained?  
Following extensive tours through Algeria and Tunisia, Churchill issued a report to the 
Surgeon General which stated the bare facts about plasma in North Africa.  Churchill 
pointed out the fact that medical authorities incorrectly labeled plasma as a blood 
substitute as there could never be a substitute for whole blood.  However, he did not deny 
the importance of plasma.   Plasma did play an important role in elevating blood pressure 
on the battlefield enough to convey the wounded to the proper triage point.  However, it 
did not allow a patient to withstand major surgery though plasma had the ability to 
superficially bring the blood pressure up to normal levels.  Further blood loss following 
plasma treatments could not be tolerated as the blood had little ability left to carry 
oxygen.  He further conveyed that plasma merely contributed to a mass excitement within 
28 
 
the medical community, which caused many to believe that the substance could truly 
replace blood.  Inexperience in the field caused many unforeseen complications.  
Inexperienced surgeons took soldiers to the operating room after prepping them with 
plasma alone.  Thus on the operating table the patient lost more blood and what little 
oxygen carrying capacity was left.  The patient then slipped back into shock and often 
died of asphyxia.  Churchill concluded from these observations that whole blood was 
without a doubt the preferred resuscitation method.  Churchill admitted that plasma could 
not be completely eliminated because of its ease of use at the front, but stated that its use 
should solely be limited to emergency first aid.8   
 Without a doubt, Churchill became whole blood’s biggest advocate in the 
Mediterranean Theater though many others doubted the feasibility of its use.  Unlike 
blood plasma, technicians would have to cross-match the donor blood with the patient 
before a transfusion.  Whole blood also had to be refrigerated at all times unlike plasma, 
thus whole blood required transportation in refrigerated trucks across the theater, which 
many felt would be an unreliable method of transportation as they thought the trucks 
would break down before their delivery.  In addition, the blood had to be held at a 
temperature about 0° Fahrenheit as it would freeze at anything lower.  This problem was 
further complicated by the fact that the product had a limited shelf life.  Physicians, both 
military and civilian, also experienced problems with coaxing people to donate to the 
armed forces.  Though the American Red Cross ran many successful blood drives 
throughout the war, many more failed.  Blood drives occurring between times of major 
action overseas saw few donors and hoards when the excitement of action on the 
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battlefield spurred them in to donate.  On the battlefield, physicians had a hard time 
getting the lightly wounded to donate blood as most presumed the donation would further 
weaken them.  Churchill stated “The stimulus of ‘I may need it when it happens to me is 
lacking-it has already- it has already happened.’”9  
 Churchill thus instituted the first major push for whole blood in the Mediterranean 
though he received little support from his superiors.  He stated that “I was not popular 
when I said that wound shock is blood volume loss.  We were soon able to say that there 
was no hemoconcentration.  There was hemodilution…We brushed away the cobwebs 
from ‘shock’ so that we could get proper means of treatment.”10   When his thoughts on 
whole blood reached the theater surgeons, Churchill was informed that plasma would be 
enough, but he would look into the problem.  Churchill issued a report back to 
Washington, D.C., two weeks after his arrival in Algiers.  In this report, he reminded the 
head of the Army Medical Corps that the goal of resuscitation was successful preparation 
for surgery.  He recalled Field Transfusion Unit #9 in this report that showed that 10% of 
all casualties needed resuscitation and 20% needed whole blood in addition to plasma for 
survival.11  He stated that this information proved that the Army must provide whole 
blood and that there was no excuse for not having whole blood readily available.  He 
stated that plasma use would merely return the blood pressure to normal and stabilize the 
peripheral circulation but “…further hemorrhage incidents to operation will be 
considerable.”12  Though many lightly wounded and auxiliary personnel were uneasy 
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about donating their own blood, many more readily donated, which enabled many 
forward hospitals to administer whole blood to the wounded despite a large stock of 
plasma.  He pointed out that blood could not be given without cross-matching as the dog 
tags had a 3-25% error rate.  Lastly, Churchill advocated a central supply depot, stating 
that “a central supply depot could provide all intravenous solutions, blood, and plasma” 
and “a distributing service would be required.  Certain units would require 
refrigerators.”13  Administrators in Washington, D.C., virtually ignored this report despite 
ample evidence to support its findings.   
 Meanwhile, Churchill took note of the British Blood Transfusion Service, which 
became the forerunner of all subsequent blood programs.  The accomplishments of this 
program came from its success in the four to six years before the war as well as pre-
planning for the distribution of blood on the battlefield.  Lionel Whitby, named the head 
of the British Army Blood Transfusion Service, insisted that the British armed forces 
have their own self-contained blood program separate from the national blood transfusion 
program because with the pre-war technology, whole blood could not be transported over 
vast distances.  Whitby and his staff planned extensively for this auxiliary unit and 
staffed the unit with the best personnel.  The British chose to solely use O blood in order 
to quickly give transfusions to all who needed it.  The British Transfusion Service 
supplemented its supply of blood on the continent with 350,000 French locals willing to 
donate blood.   The British stockpiled blood in the low country in refrigerators, but still 
experienced a shortage of blood so only the most critical received whole blood.  The 
British system proved that whole blood could be used on the battlefield though blood 
sometimes was collected in an ad hoc manner. Churchill personally recalled that the 
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British used an improvised system of sterilized beer bottles as vacuum containers and 
tubes into the donors veins in order to produce a closed transfusion system.  Though 
improvised, this system kept particles in the air from contaminating the blood supply.  
The British produced a well-established system for blood donations and transfusion 
before the war began and though the system often proved crude, it was still effective and 
a far cry from the unpreparedness of the Americans.  
 The Americans knew about the British success with blood transfusions, but had 
little way to recreate their success.  As Douglas Kendrick, wartime director of the blood 
transfusion program and author of The Blood Program in World War II, pointed out, the 
Americans were ill-equipped in all aspects in November of 1942 with no provisions for 
whole blood transfusions.  The lack of preparedness irritated many Army physicians, 
while others obtained whole blood through improvised systems.  For example, the 77th 
Evacuation Hospital located in Tebessa, obtained blood from various hospitals and shock 
teams, thus their patients received more blood than plasma through a makeshift process.  
In late June 1943, Churchill sent a task force to the forward hospitals to estimate the 
feasibility of whole blood distribution.  As expected, the forward hospitals lacked all 
capability for blood transfusions and needed the equipment desperately.   
 In order to receive the support he needed for whole blood transfusions in the 
Mediterranean Theater, Churchill sent a serious of three reports to Washington, D.C.  
Despite the receipt of Churchill’s first memorandum in March 1943, officials continued 
to ignore his call for whole blood transfusions.  He sent another notice in April again 
proclaiming the need for whole blood for the wounded on the battlefield.  The April 
report stated that the Americans, so desperate for blood, borrowed as much transfusion 
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equipment from the British as they could part with and bought other supplies from the 
French.  Churchill stated that “The need for whole blood transfusions has been personally 
verified by the Consulting Surgeon from examination of wounded patients in clearing 
stations and forward hospitals.”14 Another report of a similar nature followed with no 
reply.   
 In Washington, D.C., the Army’s Surgeon General, Norman Kirk halted all of 
Churchill’s further requests for whole blood.  He stated that the shock question had been 
answered with plasma and refused to entertain further thoughts on the matter.  
Government  officials did not want to deal with the major logistical issues that came with 
whole blood despite ample evidence from the field that plasma did not cover the issue.  
The Army invested thousands of dollars in the plasma program along with massive 
publicity campaigns as well as the support of major American companies and institutions. 
With such massive support behind one program, switching tactics in the middle of a 
major war would be troublesome.  However, Churchill did have one advocate in 
Washington, D.C.: Douglas Kendrick, director of the Army transfusion program.  
Kendrick became Churchill’s mouthpiece in the capital and constantly badgered Kirk 
over the issue.  Historian Douglas Starr illustrated this best with this anecdote: “On one 
occasion Kendrick…helped draft a resolution urging the use of whole blood as well as 
albumin and insisted on hand-carrying it to Kirk.  ‘He turned me down cold,’ Kendrick 
later recalled.  ‘He said they already had plasma and could not spare planes.’”15 Kendrick 
further reminisced on this meeting in his autobiography, Memoirs of a Twentieth-Century 
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Army Surgeon, stating that “This confrontation between me and the Surgeon General led 
to his statement, ‘Goddammit, Kendrick, if you bring this up again, I’ll throw you out of 
my office!’”16  As Churchill and his supporters received little help from their superiors in 
Washington, D.C., they turned to other methods to bring attention to their plight.   
 Churchill turned to a New York Times war correspondent since he did not receive 
the help he needed from his superiors in Washington, D.C.  He told the war 
correspondent that “You must break the story that plasma is not adequate for the 
treatment of wounded soldiers.”17 On 26 August 1943, the New York Times published an 
article titled “Plasma Alone Not Sufficient” that briefly chronicled Churchill’s struggle to 
bring whole blood to North Africa and urged the support of the American people for the 
program.  Churchill stated that “the initial breakthrough thus came with upsetting the 
balance of power in Washington, D.C., through The New York Times and making people 
in the States begin to think reasonably about the need to transfuse the wounded and 
realize that World War II could not be fought on plasma…”18  Following the report, the 
Army Medical Corps in North Africa received refrigerators for the mobile hospitals.  The 
Medical Corps also began to draw blood in advance of its need and store it away until it 
was to be used. 
Churchill charged a task force with a survey of the blood needs in the 5th Army 
the previous December 1942 in anticipation of the move into Italy.  This survey looked in 
particular at incidence of transfusion in the Field and Evacuation Hospitals. Churchill 
also sent liaisons to the blood bank in San Antonio, Texas, to study advanced methods 
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and techniques to use in the invasion of Sicily.  The San Antonio findings led to plans for 
blood banks in general hospitals and evacuation hospitals a few miles behind the lines.   
 However, this pre-planning did not stop problems from occurring as the front 
advanced through Salerno on 9 September 1943.  Though the theater had a sufficient 
supply of vacuum bottles, the forward hospitals did not have the ability to collect the 
whole blood they needed.   Colonel Joseph I. Martin, 5th Army Surgeon, requested that a 
transfusion unit be assigned to the 5th Army to counteract that problem.  However, his 
request was put on hold as army officials planned for the invasion of Anzio-Nettuno.  
Martin instead turned to the British for assistance with whole blood supplies.  Kendrick, 
author of Blood Programs in World War II, stated that “In all, the U.S. Hospitals at the 
Anzio beachhead received about 4,000 pints of blood from this source… The first blood 
from the Fifth U.S. Army blood bank in Naples was not received on the beachhead until 
23 February 1944.”19  The problems with blood collection at the front led to a push to 
collect blood instead at the base hospitals.  Blood collections at the base hospitals would 
allow the base personnel to donate blood without interruption of the business at the front.  
The stable environment allowed for more proficient testing for diseases such as malaria.  
The base hospitals provided an ideal proximity to the front while providing a stable 
environment for a full-scale blood bank.   
 These thoughts led to the establishment of the 15th Medical Laboratory Blood 
Bank on 20 November 1943, which provided the first pints of blood on 23 February 
1944.  This lab became the parent organization of the Naples blood bank, a vitally 
important entity throughout the rest of the Italian Campaign.  In its infancy, the 15th 
Medical Lab began as a 20 pint a day blood bank and strictly collected blood to supply 
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the Naples area during emergencies.  However, the officers in charge of 5th Army 
Medical Corps had bigger plans for the 15th Medical Lab.  The brass planned for the 
organization to provide up to 100 pint bottles a day.  Leadership also prepared an 
organizational chart for the smooth distribution of the temperamental substance, 
production equipment, and designed special shipping boxes to provide the utmost safety 
for the precious contents.  Through these efforts, the 15th Medical Lab was able to 
provide 0.6 to 0.7 pints of blood per battle casualty at Anzio.20  However, this was not 
enough for the 5th Army, which wanted 200 pints of blood a day.   
 In a letter to Brigadier General Fredrick Blesse, Deputy Director of Medical 
Services Allied Force Headquarter, on 3 March 1944, Churchill commented on the 
recently established 15th Medical Lab Blood Bank.  He pointed out that the British 
continued their involvement in the American whole blood venture as they transport the 
commodity, but the Americans were in the process of creating 14 specially designed cork 
boxes for that purpose.  Churchill stated that according to his sources, the use of whole 
blood was on the rise across the Mediterranean, which he considered a victory.  However, 
many physicians were not using enough blood per patient to do them any good though 
the use of whole blood became widespread.  In the letter, Churchill proposed a whole 
blood system for the Italian Campaign that would provide a proficient system for the 
efficient distribution of blood.  This plan divided the task of blood processing and 
distribution between three different entities.  The base hospital was to collect, process and 
forward blood to an Army distribution unit.  Here, the blood waited for distribution to the 
Army and Corps hospital blood banks.  The Hospital then provided the blood to unit 
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blood banks.  He intended that the field hospitals would do little of their own bleeding, 
and the evacuation hospitals would supplement the supply with their own blood 
collecting.  Churchill stated that the mission of the Blood Transfusion Unit (BTU) was to 
supply blood to the Army, but not to the base hospital except in times of emergency.  
Any blood collected other than that collected by the Army Distribution Center became 
the sole responsibility of the individual hospital and was ordered to follow the same 
testing instructions as the distribution center.  Churchill reiterated the importance of 
typing and crossmatching blood before a transfusion and recommended that all units of 
blood have a 24-hour rest period before use in order to facilitate testing.  He insisted on 
the provision of a small vial of blood attached to the pint for testing.   
 Churchill required the BTU to put out 100 units of O blood seven days a week 
and label the units with an expiration date (whole blood preservation was still in its 
infancy and the expiration date became all important, especially during this period).  The 
blood would then be kept at 4° Celsius (at 0° components of the whole blood begin to 
freeze rendering the unit useless).  The vacuum bottles that contained whole blood were 
disposed of following a transfusion in order to prevent infection and reactions, however 
the specially designed insulated boxes were returned to the base hospital for further use.  
Churchill wanted the Army to keep a three day supply of blood on hand at the 
distribution center, which could be used rapidly without waste.   
 Churchill did not implement his plan without conflict as many of his colleagues 
had their own ideas on blood distribution.  Fellow 5th Army Surgeon Henry K. Beecher 
stated that the base collecting needed to increase its daily output of whole blood in order 
to relieve the evacuation hospitals of this duty during peak activity.  Churchill, however, 
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disagreed with him saying that the unit should have its share of responsibility with whole 
blood collecting.  He justified this logic stating that this would keep each of the units in 
the whole blood chain independent when they could not acquire a delivery.  Additionally, 
Churchill stated that he wanted whole blood spread out instead of concentrated at the 
base.  Naples could supply most of the blood required in Italy as it had become the largest 
blood bank in the Mediterranean Theater.   
 Beecher further disagreed with Churchill when it came to only providing O-type 
blood to the troops, as he wanted A-type blood supplied as well.  In a letter to Churchill, 
he stated that he had become alarmed by the large number of reactions to O-blood.  Many 
objected to the use of A-blood by the base hospitals on the grounds that the type could 
easily be mixed among the O-bloods and with the mass sense of urgency on the 
battlefield, using solely O-blood would be easier on everyone involved.  Beecher 
disagreed and stated that providing A-blood would cause no extra inconvenience and 
only 3.2 units of blood out of every 12 units produced would be type A.  He planned for 
equal distribution throughout the evacuation hospitals with additional reserves of A-
blood.  Further needs would have to be provided locally and thus the hospitals would 
need to keep a list on hand of local A donors for emergencies.   
 Churchill chronicled this debate in his journal and stated that he felt that the 
problem was with mass mislabeling of blood units and the blood personnel needed more 
supervision on the local level to prevent such mistakes.  He felt that the turning point had 
come with the large influx of new personnel, which had led to the labeling mistakes.  
Furthermore, the O-blood provided for the wounded would need to be low-titered.21  
                                                            
21 Low titered blood would be of reduced concentration, which enabled it to be given to patients of other 
blood types.  
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Providing low-titered blood would allow for the slight dilution of O-blood for patients 
with A or B blood types.  Low-titered blood would allow these patients to received O-
blood without fear of major reactions.  Thus the reaction problem was solved without the 
burden of providing A and B blood types specifically.   
 The establishment of the blood bank in Italy further solved the problem with 
whole blood transportation, the biggest problem in whole blood distribution.  When the 
blood bank first provided blood to Anzio, it shipped the stock via Landing Ship Tanks 
(LST) as the battlefield was isolated.  From 23 February to May 1944, the bank drew 
over 4,134 pints of blood.  This scale drastically increased as the US Army began its 
drive to Cassino.  During the month of May alone, the blood banks drew over 6,000 pints 
of blood in preparation for this campaign.  Aircraft such as the C-47 made for more 
efficient transportation to Anzio though the Army never completely abandoned 
transportation by the LSTs.  This air transportation drastically reduced the waste of whole 
blood.  Planes shipped whole blood to the front within 24 hours and returned with a cargo 
of five to six day old blood for immediate use.   
 Planning for the invasion August 1944 of southern France showed just how 
precise and efficient the Army Medical Corp became with blood transportation.  The 
Naples blood bank planned to support the 7th Army that would be moving into France.  
This well experienced blood bank trained a new crew to care for the blood supply moving 
into France.  The new crew instituted a bleeding center where blood would be drawn that 
would support the Army from an Italian base until the Naples crew could move to France.  
Planes loaded with whole blood flew from Italy to Corsica where a PT boat delivered the 
load to the different landing beaches as invasion forces had not yet linked the beaches.  
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The PT boat deliveries continued through D-Day plus eight when crews readied the 
airfields for the incoming planes.  The forward distributors of the Blood Transportation 
units landed on the sites with the 7th Army ready to serve.  From the beachhead 
refrigerated trucks distributed blood out to the various platoons and hospitals.   
 Thus, Churchill saw his visions for the blood program in the Mediterranean 
Theater realized with the effectiveness of the blood program in the south of France.  
Plasma use had all but been eliminated except in emergency situations.  Whole blood, 
which most thought an unfeasible solution previously, made its mark on the battlefield 
and proved once and for all that there was no replacement for its restorative abilities.  The 
whole blood knowledge gained in the Mediterranean spread to the European and Pacific 
theaters and physicians from both locations sent liaisons to the Mediterranean to learn 
from Churchill and his associates.  Though Churchill continued to work in North Africa 
and Italy on various surgical concepts, his work with whole blood proved to be his 
legacy.   
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Chapter IV 
SULFONAMIDES AND SURGERY 
 Edward Churchill travelled thousands of miles during his tenure as the 
Mediterranean Theater surgical consultant, examined wounds, and offered advice that 
improved the quality of medical care in the theater.  One of the most challenging 
problems Churchill faced was in halting the rampant use of sulfonamides.  In his early 
days in the theater, Churchill found that sulfonamides, an anti-bacterial drug that many 
physicians deemed a “miracle drug,” replaced proper surgical techniques in the operating 
room.  Over and over, Churchill saw the abandonment of proper debridement techniques 
for this easy and simplified solution.  Often, this easy solution merely led to infection, 
allergic reaction, and death.  In April 1943, Churchill saw firsthand the adverse effects of 
sulfonamides in a soldier admitted to the 77th Evacuation Hospital in Tunisia.  Medical 
aides and physicians on the battlefield and in forward hospitals had packed the soldier’s 
wounds with large quantities of sulfonamides instead of removing the dead skin and 
foreign materials in the wounds.  By the time he reached the evacuation hospital, the 
soldier contracted a severe infection and a high fever.  The medical team at the 77th 
immediately drained the purulent wounds and removed the high explosive fragments and 
dead tissues that hindered the wound from healing.  The clean wound fared much better 
and the soldier healed accordingly.  This was but one of the many cases of sulfonamide 
misuse the Churchill observed throughout the theater.  Thus, Churchill set out to reverse 
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the trend of misuse of sulfonamide and replace it with proper surgical techniques that 
promoted effective wound healing that would return the soldier to full health.1   
By the beginning of World War II, the overuse of sulfonamides had already 
become a commonplace problem in the medical community.  Gerhard Domagk, a 
German scientist, discovered the basic sulfonamide compound in 1927, which caused a 
great stir among the scientific community. Many thought this drug could cure many of 
the bacterial infections that plagued the world population.  Subsequently, researchers 
exhausted exorbitant amounts of resources in researching the chemical make up the 
sulfonamides.   European scientists found great success with their experiments with many 
variations of the sulfonamides throughout the 1930s.  Perrin Long and his associates at 
Johns Hopkins University introduced America to the sulfonamides with their experiments 
in 1936, which successfully brought the concept of chemotherapy to America.  Long later 
became the Chief Consultant in Medicine in the Mediterranean Theater and worked 
closely with Churchill, perhaps compounding the difficulty Churchill faced in eradicating 
sulfonamide use.  The 1940s saw the list of sulfonamides expand drastically.  Vast 
numbers of people hailed the compounds as a miracle sent to save them from dreaded 
infections that no other drug could cure.  Patients asked for the drug by name and the 
doctors readily consented to the prescription.  The October 1939 issue of the British 
Medical Journal stated that sulfonamides provided a “…certainty of benefit such as no 
previous remedy for the same conditions could approach.”2  Sulfapyridine became among 
the most acclaimed of the sulfonamides, as scientists stated that “…there seemed to be no 
                                                            
1 Edward D. Churchill, Surgeon to Soldiers: Diary and Records of the Surgical Consultant Allied Force 
Headquarters, World War II (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1972), 64. 
2 “Chemotherapy and Infections in War,” The British Medical Journal 2 (1939): 859. 
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end to its uses.”3  Article after article in scientific journals and various other sources 
proclaimed that the sulfonamides could cure all manner of disease.  The public clamored 
for the product as the scientific community backed sulfonamide’s powers.  Sulfa drugs 
solidified their place in the American armed forces with their “effective” use at the attack 
on Pearl Harbor.   
The attack on Pearl Harbor witnessed the first use of sulfonamides en masse in a 
military setting.  Colonel Edgar King, the surgeon-in-charge of the medical corps in 
Hawaii, organized the civilian, Army, and Navy medical personnel for faster response 
time in case of an emergency, which included access to copious amounts of blood plasma 
and sulfonamides.  As the alarms sounded the 7 December 1941 attack, medical 
personnel brought 14 pounds of sulfanilamide, one of the many sulfonamide derivatives, 
from Tripler General Hospital at Honolulu and administered it to the incoming patients.   
At Hickam Field, the station hospital became overwhelmed with casualties forcing the 
medical staff to turn the hospital into a clearing station, stabilizing the wounded long 
enough for transportation to Tripler General Hospital.  These wounds included high 
explosive fragments, machine gun wounds, and secondary missile wounds, which the 
staff packed with sulfonamides.  Once at Tripler, physicians debrided the wounds 
thoroughly, clearing the wound of all foreign objects and dead tissue.  Scientists, 
physicians, and the American community praised the dramatic use of sulfonamides at 
Hickam Field and Tripler General, though the removal of dead tissue and objects from 
the wounds played a larger part in preventing innumerable infections. The Science 
Newsletter article on the success of sulfonamides at Pearl Harbor did mention 
debridement, but also stated physicians used more than 68 grams (2.39 ounces) of 
                                                            
3 John E. Lesch, The First Miracle Drug (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 181. 
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sulfanilamide in the wounds as well as multiple doses of sulfathiozole by mouth to ensure 
the suppression of germs.4   
Praise for the sulfonamide use at Pearl Harbor continued in the upper echelons of 
the Armed Services.  On 17 December 1941, the US Army flew a committee to Hawaii to 
observe the continued treatment of the wounded from the attack.  This committee 
included Perrin Long of Johns Hopkins University, the man responsible for introducing 
sulfonamides to America, and L.S. Ravdin, a professor of surgery at the University of 
Pennsylvania.  They documented their findings in their report, “Some Observations on 
the Casualties of Pearl Harbor” in which the two stated “We have been impressed again 
and again with the incalculable value of sulfonamide therapy in the care of many 
casualties.” 5  The pair examined many wounds including compound fractures ,which the 
doctors did not have time to thoroughly debride, but stated that such wounds were saved 
from infection by the ample use of sulfonamides.  They again praised the drug stating that 
wounds could be left untreated for up to 72 hours and free from infection if treated with 
sulfonamides.  In the eyes of physicians and scientists alike, sulfonamides had proven 
themselves battle ready.   
 The extent to which the American and British professionals relied on 
sulfonamides alarmed Colonel Churchill when he arrived in Algiers on 6 March 1943.  
Even Heneage Ogilvie, a prominent British Surgeon and vice president of the Royal 
College of Surgeons, endorsed sulfonamides stating that these drugs revolutionized 
medical care and should be the first line of defense against infection in wounds.  Ogilvie 
stated at the meeting of the Committee on Surgery for the National Research Council that 
                                                            
4 “Pearl Harbor was the Scene of a Sweeping Victory for Drugs,” Science Newsletter 41 (1942): 53. 
5 “Some Observations on the Casualties at Pearl Harbor,” Edward Churchill Papers, Box 29, Folder 5, 
Francis A. Countway Library of Medicine, Boston, MA. 
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“…the meticulous excision of the wound as developed in the last war was not necessary” 
and stressed the “lifesaving qualities of sulfonamides.”6  Such attitudes in even the most 
prominent of physicians led to lax care for wounds in the name of convenience.  Proper 
debridement became reduced to wound trimming, a superficial removal of the dead 
tissues as surgeons put their faith in sulfonamides as the best defense against infection.   
However, the outcome of sulfonamide proved otherwise.  At the clearing station, 
a soldier’s first stop in the line of evacuation, aids and medical personnel packed the 
wounds full of powdered sulfonamides.  The powder then caked in the wound instead of 
dissolving as the physicians had hoped.  When medical personnel undressed the wound 
for further treatment, they often found festered wounds with large amounts of 
undissolved sulfa powder inside.  Churchill quickly pointed out the fact that such local 
application of sulfonamides did not produce adequate results.  He stated that “It [locally 
applied sulfonamides] dries and cakes, forming a shell that closes in infection.”7   
Churchill further observed physician’s dissatisfaction with sulfonamide treated wounds at 
the 77th Evacuation Hospital at Oran.  The 77th received many wounded treated by the 
French who excised the wounds, packed the wound with sulfa, and dressed the wound 
before sending the soldier along the evacuation route.  Many of these wounds that arrived 
at the 77th were severely infected as none had been properly excised.  The sulfonamides, 
though effective if used minimally, would never work in such conditions.  Churchill 
pointed out that “Dead tissues and pus contain substances that inhibit the action of 
sulfonamides.  Local application is not a substitute for adequate surgery.”8 
                                                            
6 “Personal Notes on the Suture of Wounds,” Edward Churchill Papers, Box 29, Folder 6, Francis A. 
Countway Library of Medicine, Boston, MA.   
7 Surgeon to Soldiers, 67. 
8 Ibid, 65. 
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 Not only did sulfonamides alone do little to treat battle wounds, they also reduced 
the importance placed on the proper timing of surgery.  As seen in the 72 hour limit 
placed at Pearl Harbor, physicians left wounds that would have normally been surgically 
repaired as soon as deemed possible, were allowed to wait as surgeons felt that 
sulfonamides bought them extra time.  Even Perrin Long, the physician who praised the 
sulfonamide use at Pearl Harbor, warned against the drug’s over use.  In Circular Letter 
No. 1, in February 1943, Long warned against local use of sulfonamides as well as 
systemic use.  He stated that if a soldier received a dose of sulfonamides orally then the 
local dose should be reduced and vice versa.  Churchill also commented stating the fact 
that local application of sulfonamides had little use altogether and instead, medical 
personnel should rely on systemic administration of sulfonamides if use the drugs at all.9   
 Sulfa allergies posed another problem for injured soldiers as well.  Churchill 
observed a patient at the 12th General Hospital in Oran whose pants had caught fire after 
an accident with gasoline. The aides who attended to him immediately applied sulfa 
topically, dressed his wound, and repeated this process every three days.  The soldier 
contracted a rash en route to the general hospital, which physicians presumed was 
because the soldier was dirty.  At the 12th General Hospital, doctors diagnosed him with 
Dermatitis medicomentosa, an allergic reaction to the vast amounts of sulfonamide he 
had been given.  The doctors immediately ceased all sulfonamide treatments and the rash 
disappeared.  Physicians treated the same soldier again with sulfonamides when his 
wound appeared to be infected.  Again, the rash reappeared and then disappeared with the 
doctor’s discontinued treatment.  Churchill pointed out that the doctors had no way of 
                                                            
9 Ibid. 
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knowing which soldiers would be allergic to the sulfa drugs, which was yet another 
reason to discontinue their use.     
 Though doctors themselves often relied too heavily on the sulfonamides, the 
soldiers themselves complicated the problem as ease of access to the sulfa drugs led to 
self-treatment.  After great success with sulfonamides at Pearl Harbor, surgeons gave 
sulfonamide tablets to all US soldiers on the battlefield.  The ease of access to the drugs 
calmed the soldiers - if wounded they knew they had a “lifesaving” drug in hand.  
However, soldiers took advantage of their access to the sulfa drugs and self-medicated for 
any ailment.  A report by Albert Hatcher, the battalion surgeon of the medical detachment 
of the 434th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion in November 1944 
called attention to the problem stating that far too many soldiers requested excessive 
amounts of sulfonamide tablets citing that their supply had been lost, crushed, or had 
dissolved.  Documentation from the field indicated that soldiers used these extra supplies 
to self-medicate for problems such as diarrhea, minor infections, and prophylaxis for self-
diagnosed sexually transmitted diseases.  The report stated that the overuse of 
sulfonamides did not decrease after medical personnel issued a warning stating that 
overuse of sulfonamides would render them unusable for future infections the soldier 
may contract.  Hatcher recommended that such sulfa packets no longer be issued to the 
troops and that the authority to provide sulfonamides be restricted to medical officers and 
qualified aid-men.  Churchill received this report during his visit to the 5th Army and 
heartily consented to its message.10 
                                                            
10 “Issue of Sulfonamide Wound Tablets,” 18 November 1944, Edward Churchill Papers, Box 28, Folder 6, 
Francis A. Countway Library Medicine, Boston, MA.   
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 Stopping surgeons and soldiers alike from using sulfonamide was easier said than 
done.  Sulfonamides provided an easy solution for battlefield wounds instead of the 
alternative, the reparative surgery.  Reparative surgery proved a tedious task that required 
much specialized training, none of which the civilian doctors who made up the Army 
Medical Corps had.   This situation was further complicated by the fact that the National 
Research Council, the U.S. government’s brain trust on scientific matters, did not issue 
uniformed guidelines on the proper method to suture wounds.  Therefore, patients arrived 
at the hospitals with all manner of wound closures according to the various 
interpretations of their doctors.   
The task of determining which manner to suture wounds closed plagued their 
World War I predecessors as well.  However, the surgeons of the World War I reached a 
consensus on antiseptics and wound closures and produced uniform, clean wound 
sutures.  The surgeons of the World War II could have learned much from their 
predecessors on wounds and wound closures, a fact that Churchill lamented.   Other 
surgeons in the field noticed this same problem as well.  Lt. Col. Michael DeBakey and 
Col. B. Noland Carter of the Austrailian Medical Corps stated that “…there has been 
some lag in the effort made to utilize, from the last war, the ‘wisdom purchased at so 
tremendous a price.’”11  Physicians would have known that antiseptics alone could not 
treat infections, had knowledge of the battlefield medical practices of the World War I 
been disseminated.   Sir Anthony Bowlby, a Consulting Surgeon to the British Forces in 
France in World War I, stated that “We realized that we had attributed too much power 
for evil to the microbic invasions; that the infection was too gross to be combated by 
                                                            
11 Lt. Col. Michael E. DeBakey and Col. B. Noland Carter, “Current Considerations of War Surgery,” 
Annals of Surgery 121 (1945): 552. 
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antiseptics; and that the source of the danger was to be sought for in the damaged of dead 
tissues contaminated by the mud of the manured fields and in the portions of the muddy 
clothing and the missiles which were buried in the wounds.”12  This realization led the 
important process of thorough wound excision.  Bowlby stated that without a properly 
cleaned wound, “… antiseptics are useless and in proportion as technique is good, and 
excision can be done early and can be really complete, antiseptics applied inside the 
wound are merely accessory.”13 How much skin comprised a proper excision posed 
another problem, many surgeons removing too little in order to prevent damage to tissues 
and muscles, which led to unopened pockets of devitalized tissue and suppurated wounds.  
Drury Hinton, M.D. of the British Expeditionary Forces stated, “The more carefully the 
dead tissue is removed and the more thoroughly all recesses are explored, the better are 
the results.” 14  
 Once these World War I surgeons excised the wounds, they had to make a 
decision about how best to close the wound.  Surgeons used the primary suture early in 
the war, which entailed closing the wound as soon as they had finished debridement and 
repairs.  In numerous cases this worked, but in many more the primary suture caused 
further complications.  Many felt that the primary suture closed the wound prematurely, 
locking in dead tissues and foreign objects.  These primary sutured wounds were prone to 
infect and other complications caused by evacuation across rough terrain.  Wounds 
needed rest in a stable environment under the constant care of a physician familiar with 
the patient’s wound to ensure proper healing.  Surgeons instead deferred to the delayed 
                                                            
12 Sir Anthony Bowlby, “An Address on Primary Suture of Wounds at the Front in France,” The British 
Medical Journal 1 (1918): 333. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Drury Hinton, “Suture of War Wounds,” Annals of Surgery 71 (1920): 193. 
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primary suture or secondary closure of all wounds.   In this procedure, surgeons purged 
the wounds of all harmful materials at the Casualty Clearing Station or other forward 
locations.  The wounds were left open, carefully bandaged, and moved along the 
evacuation route following this procedure.  Once the wounded had reached a stable 
location, surgeons proceeded with an examination of the wound to ensure the absence of 
infection, which included a culture sent to a laboratory for a bacteria count.  Physicians 
promptly proceeded with the wound closure if the results came back negative.  William 
S. Baer, an orthopedic surgeon with the American Expeditionary Force, pointed out that 
the wounded should be moved six to seven hours following their debridement operation 
and closed between the second and fourth day to insure the absence of infection.  This 
process afforded the wounded soldiers a shorter recovery period, fewer future 
complications, as well as returned more soldiers to the front sooner.     
 The failure of this information from the World War I to carry over to the World 
War II was further complicated by the fact that the American Army Medical Corps was 
comprised mostly of civilian physicians.  In civilian medical practices, surgeons easily 
opened a wound, excised it, and sutured the wound closed in one surgery.  Civilian 
surgeries occurred in stable and sterile environments where the patients rested 
comfortably until their wounds healed.  However, neither stable nor sterile environments 
were available on the battlefield.  Churchill described North Africa as a dust filled 
environment where many of the troops did not have the facilities to properly maintain 
personal hygiene or change clothes while they served long stints on the front lines of 
combat early in the war.  Such an environment only enhanced the probability of wound 
contamination.  This problem was compounded by the fact that medics kept the wounded 
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soldiers moving along the evacuation line eliminating any hope for the proper rest they 
needed to recover.  Lt. Col. Michael DeBakey stated that “Judged by the highest standard 
of civilian practice, the military environment preclude ideal surgical practice and imposes 
certain modifications upon the treatment of the wounded.”15  As Churchill discovered, 
these said modifications were easier said than actually instituted.   
 After the war, Churchill recalled the difficulty involved in getting civilian doctors 
to understand battlefield surgery from a military aspect.  Churchill stated that “…he 
[civilian doctor] still would have no conception of the destructive force of high-velocity 
missiles or the timing factor so important in treatment, and the many other elements that 
make wound surgery a specialty its self.”16  The new civilian surgeons rarely if ever 
encountered the types of wounds seen on the battlefield, which inhibited their ability to 
properly care for the injured soldiers.  Churchill and his fellow surgical consultants faced 
the challenge of turning these civilian doctors into military surgeons by teaching them 
proper debridement methods, suturing techniques, as well as accurately timing these 
operations to ensure that the wounded healed.   
If the civilian doctors intended to treat the wounded properly, the wounds 
required debridement, which meant all dead tissues and foreign objects must be removed 
from the interior of the wound carefully or risk damaging healthy tissues.  As Churchill 
stated, often times these foreign objects would not be metallic and therefore would not 
appear on an x-ray.  Therefore the surgeons needed to open the wounds wide in order to 
extract the foreign objects.  Though this was the ideal situation, the early surgeries that 
Churchill observed soon after his arrival in the field did not meet these high standards.  
                                                            
15 “Current Considerations of War Surgery,” 550. 
16 Surgeon to Soldiers, 180. 
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Inexperienced surgeons often left pockets of necrotic tissues and pus deep within the 
wounds, which prolonged the patient’s recovery as well as ran the risk of life threatening 
complications.  The treatment of compound fractures early in the war gives a prime 
example of the dangers caused by inexperienced war surgeons.  Early treatment of 
compound fractures, a fracture in which the broken bone pierced the skin, comprised of 
poor debridement as well as casing the wound in a plaster cast to stabilize the injury for 
further evacuation.  The casing process took place in the forward hospitals and the 
surgeons typically left the cast on for four to six weeks with the thought that the wound 
would have healed to granulation, a process in which tissue temporarily forms inside the 
wound to replace the tissue lost.  This procedure easily worked in the civilian sector, but 
when surgeons reopened the cast they found the plaster within disintegrated and the skin 
covered in blisters and pressure sores from the cast.  Though some cast looked promising, 
when removed revealed severe infections brought on by the devitalized tissue that 
remained in the wound as well as hematomas, a mass of clotted blood, in the undrained 
dead spaces.   
  Problems such as the infected compound fractures are but one example of the 
various surgical mishaps Churchill faced as he toured the North African Theater.  He 
stated that the surgeons focused more on what they were doing, such as the closed plaster 
techniques as well as sulfa treatments, instead of not doing.  The surgeons were quite 
capable of taking the wound apart but rarely put the wound together again.  Churchill 
stated that for these procedures performed in this manner “All we need is the simple kit 
of the Civil War surgeon-scalpel-saw-forceps…”17  Other surgeons excised too much 
skin as they attempted to debride the wounds. Physicians in the field went from excising 
                                                            
17 Ibid, 186. 
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too little skin, which led to an infected wound, to excising far too much tissue and leaving 
the wound wide open.  Surgeons attempting to close a wound in which too much skin had 
been excised found that the sutures caused too much tension and the wound would break 
down.     
 While the surgeons may have begun to excise the wounds properly, the methods 
they used to suture them caused problems just as they had done in the World War I, the 
most problematic being the primary suture.  Primary sutures consisted of closing the 
wound immediately following the debridement surgery, which often caused the wound to 
suppurate just as had been proven in the World War I.  Further evacuation only enhanced 
the dangers inherent in this type of suture.  As Debakey pointed out in Current 
Considerations of War Surgery, some of the primary sutures may heal properly, but 
surgeons could never know which ones would do so.  Churchill and Debakey both 
summarized that this was a risk that should not be taken when there were other options.  
Debakey stated “Primary closure enhances the development of life-endangering infection 
and interruption in the continuity of professional supervision imposed by evacuation 
precludes its early detection.”18  Instead, Churchill intimated that such wounds should be 
carefully bandaged following debridement.  The wound need not be packed with gauze, 
which would further damage the wound, but instead the surgeon should insert a thin mesh 
cloth in the wound followed by a bandage, readying the wound for evacuation.  These 
carefully bandaged wounds frequently became infected as the wounded were evacuated 
by medical personnel who removed them in order to check the wound.  Churchill pointed 
out in his 1943 Annual Report to the North African Theater of Operations Headquarters 
that “Lifting up the corner of the dressing with fingers to inspect the wounds was 
                                                            
18 “Current Considerations of War Surgery,” 550. 
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oftentimes repeated in several stations before the casualty arrived at a hospital for 
emergency surgery.  Even then, the wound might be exposed with the patient on a litter 
on the floor of the receiving tent…”19 Instead the medical staff needed to pass the 
wounded to the rear with the original bandage undisturbed in order to avoid unsafe levels 
of contamination.   
 The debridement and bandaging process comprised the first phase of a two-phase 
system that Churchill later devised similar to the system used in the World War I.  The 
first phase promoted the already described debridement process as well as chemotherapy 
if needed.  The second phase commenced after the patient arrived at a general hospital 
where the casualty could recover from the reparative surgery in peace.  This concluding 
surgery began with an examination of the wound followed by secondary sutures if the 
gross appearance was deemed satisfactory.  Churchill laid out the four steps of this 
second phase in his article, “The Surgical Management of the Wounded in the 
Mediterranean Theater at the time of the Fall of Rome.”   First, the surgeons would 
decide by the appearance of the would whether it could be closed or not doing away with 
the time consuming method of bacteria cultures from the World War I.  Churchill nixed 
this step calling it unnecessary as an infection severe enough to prevent closure of the 
wound would be visible to the human eye.  Secondly, if the wound appeared purulent, the 
medical staff would clean the wound.  He pointed out that if the debridement process had 
been done properly, then this step would be minimal.  Next, the surgeons would perform 
a secondary wound closure a few days later.  He stated that the medical staff could give 
the patient a dose of penicillin if the staff deemed the medicine necessary, but that if the 
                                                            
19 “Wound Infection and Wound Healing Report,” Edward Churchill Papers, Box 35, Folder 15, Francis A. 
Countway Library of Medicine, Boston, MA.  
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surgeons performed the process correctly, the medication could be freely omitted.  Lastly, 
Churchill pointed out the extreme importance of the “time-lag” between each step of the 
surgical process.  He stated that “The time-lag between wounding and initial surgery 
referred to as ‘the golden period’ has been greatly reduced by the organization of medical 
service in the forward area to this end.  The time-lag between initial surgery and 
reparative surgery has now assumed an equal degree of importance.”20 He called the four 
to ten days following debridement the “golden period” for wound closure, fixing 
fractures, removal of foreign material, and infection prevention.  Churchill pointed out 
that eventually, failure to take advantage of early reparative surgery would be as 
unthinkable as not removing foreign materials from the wounds.  
 Though Churchill saw the advantage of secondary sutures, many of his fellow 
surgeons did not embrace this change to their techniques well as Churchill found out 
during his tour across North Africa.  Upon his arrival at the 21st General Hospital in Bou 
Hanifia , Churchill asked about how the surgeons pursued secondary sutures.  He stated 
that “…I was met by incredulous looks.  As I learned afterwards, steps were underway to 
forbid this procedure from being undertaken.”21  However, he met Major Wendell Dove, 
the head of Septic Surgery at the 21st General Hospital, who pursued secondary sutures 
despite doubt from his fellow surgeons.  Dove’s unorthodox methods so scared the other 
surgeons though, that they had in motion a special order to stop him from such sutures 
and took offense when Churchill asked to see Dove perform a secondary suture.  Dove’s 
patient that Churchill observed was a young soldier with a leg wound in which an 
incision had been made directly through a tattoo of a peacock.  The wound compromised 
                                                            
20 Edward D. Churchill, “The Surgical Management of the Wounded in the Mediterranean Theater at the 
Time of the Fall of Rome,” Annals of Surgery 120 (1944):283.” 
21 Surgeons to Soldiers, 183.   
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a traditional secondary wound closure in which the wound had begun to granulate as it 
healed.  The edges had become stiff and undercuts, a loosening of the skin around the 
edges of the wound in order for the wound to be closed, would be required to bring the 
wound together.22  Dove closed the wound without incident with the added 
accomplishment of keeping the peacock tattoo intact, which proved that too much skin 
had not been debrided, a common criticism of forward surgery by those in the rear.  
Across the theater, surgeons were taking on such unorthodox procedures despite the 
doubts of their contemporaries.    
 While some surgeons did attempt the secondary sutures, many attempted them far 
too early, which caused complications.  Any such suture attempted before the fourth day 
after the excision surgery became known as a delayed primary suture.  The wound did not 
have enough time to rest nor did the patient between surgeries with the added 
complication that these early closures often led to severe infections.  Churchill saw this 
firsthand as he visited the 59th Evacuation Hospital in Casablanca where the surgeons 
encouraged discontinuing delayed primary sutures after several failed closures arrived at 
the hospital.  The 59th received over 200 prisoners of war, twenty of whom had their 
wounds closed within 48 to 72 hours prior.  The 59th found that 16 of these 20 patients 
showed signs of purulent, septic wounds.  These surgeons opposed secondary sutures as 
well for the same reasons.  Churchill researched these statements and said, “…it was 
found that these were instances of delayed primary suture evacuated within a few days of 
closure.  Of course, they (the closure) broke down.”23  In order to prevent further 
discontent with the secondary closure procedure, Churchill implemented proper closure 
                                                            
22 Undercutting a wound would relieve enough tension along the wound edges to close the wound.   
23Surgeon to Soldiers, 187.  
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techniques by educating his fellow surgeons about the proper timing of wound closures.  
Though delayed primary sutures and secondary sutures seemed similar, closure timing 
meant the difference between a wound that broke down and one that healed and returned 
a soldier to duty.   
 Though the system Churchill and his fellow consultants implemented took much 
work, by the end of the war they saw the pleasant effects of this method.  One consulting 
surgeon stated in his August 1944 letter that the surgeons of the Mediterranean Theater 
had done away with the trimming operations of the early war years in exchange for a 
thorough excision of the wound, terminated the closed plaster method, as well as divided 
wound surgery into two distinct methods.  These practices, the surgeon claimed, had 
helped close thousands of wounds with great success.  Reports flowed into Churchill 
from all over the Mediterranean about the success of secondary sutures.  Captain Samuel 
Flowers of the 64th Station Hospital reported on the success that he and his staff had with 
all wounds closed in the ten to fourteen days following debridement.  The surgeons 
frosted the wound with sulfa, applied a moderate pressure dressing, and immobilized the 
wound. Flowers reported that this procedure produced a wound that healed rapidly and 
cleanly.  These are but two examples of the success brought about by Churchill’s 
advocacy of secondary sutures.  The use of primary sutures and the overuse of 
sulfonamides halted by the end of war as well were a testimony to Churchill’s 
persistence. 
 At the beginning of the war, Churchill would have never expected such success 
from the surgical principles he advocated.  Surgeons disregarded proper surgical 
techniques in favor of the convenience offered by the new sulfonamide drugs.  The 
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popularity of  these drugs came after physicians attending the wounded at Pearl Harbor 
praised them for saving so many lives.  However, these drugs only masked the problem 
for a short period of time on the battlefield.  The aid men at the front packed the wounds 
with sulfa powders.  When the doctors at the evacuation and general hospitals opened 
these wounds again, they found an inflamed, purulent wound.  Churchill stated instead 
the surgeons needed to rely on the proven surgical methods of the World War I instead of 
the sulfonamides.  The physicians in the World War I stated that the only sure way to 
ensure that a wound would heal would be through proper debridement followed by a 
period of rest to guarantee the absence of infection.  The surgeons pursued secondary 
sutures a few days later, after which the patients fully recovered.  However, the civilian 
surgeons in the World War II strongly resisted these methods calling them unorthodox as 
well as unnecessary.  Churchill proved over and over by example that though considered 
unorthodox, the secondary sutures yielded a better healing wound than the one-step 
surgery that the civilian doctors performed.  These education efforts, though tedious, 
proved successful by the end of the war.  Churchill overthrew the doubts that his fellow 
surgeons had about surgical techniques such as the secondary suture.  These efforts 
provided each of the battlefield surgeons with surgically sound methods that ensured that 
each of the wounded soldiers returned to full health.    
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Chapter V  
MEDICAL EVACUATION 
 The medical evacuation process, the procedure used to move casualties from the 
battlefield through a network of medical stations, implemented in the Mediterranean 
Theater, though relatively simple, proved a difficult concept to execute.  However, the 
stable medical evacuation plan proved an invaluable asset once established.  Army 
medical historian Albert E. Cowdrey demonstrated the smoothness of the evacuation 
scheme as it existed in late 1943 in his book Fighting for Life.  Cowdrey recalled the 
harrowing medical evacuation of Richard Tregaskis, an American wartime journalist hit 
by a shell as he scaled a hilltop in Cassino, Italy.  Tregaskis stated in Invasion Diary, his 
account of his time in Sicily and Italy, that “I realized I had been badly hit.  I was still 
stretched on the rocks.  A couple of feet from me lay my helmet which had been gashed 
in at least two places, one hole at the front and another ripping through the sides.”1 
Following his injury, Tregaskis received aid from a medic and then made his way to an 
aid station with the help of a fellow soldier.  From the aid station, the first step in the 
evacuation line, Tregaskis and all other evacuees were taken to a collecting station. Here, 
physicians checked the wounded once more and the most severely injured received 
immediate blood transfusions.  Next, evacuees were taken by litter to the clearing station 
where physicians separated out those needing immediate treatment and took these 
casualties to the field hospital adjacent to the clearing station.  These casualties received 
                                                            
1 Richard Tregaskis, Invasion Diary (New York: Random House, 1944), 208-209. 
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lifesaving surgery at the field station such as stabilization of injuries and surgical repair 
of any immediately life threatening injuries.  Surgeons kept these casualties at the field 
hospital until their injuries stabilized enough to allow them to be evacuated.  Ambulances 
or air evacs next took the casualties to the evacuation hospital where surgeons performed 
definitive surgery.  All previous surgeries performed were in anticipation of the 
causalities’ arrival at the evacuation hospital.  Here, bones were mended and surgeries 
involving the brain, such as Tregaskis’s, were performed.  When casualties recovered 
enough to withstand travel, they were removed by ambulance or airplane to the 
communication zone where they were admitted to the base hospitals, a permanent part of 
the communication zone.  Here, the casualties could recover safely in the hands of well-
trained surgeons who had the best equipment available to them.  The base hospitals were 
a relatively safe distance from the front, which relieved any worries the wounded had of 
being caught in the line of fire.  This smooth working evacuation system removed 
casualties such as Tregaskis to safety quickly and efficiently, saving many lives.  
However, this smooth operating evacuation system did not exist when Colonel Churchill 
encountered it late 1942.2   
The joint American-British invasion of North Africa, otherwise known as 
Operation Torch, began on 8 November 1942, beginning America’s long three year 
involvement in the Mediterranean Theater of World War II.  Colonel Churchill arrived in 
the theater three months later in February 1943 to find the Army Medical Corps in 
disarray, some of which has been previously discussed.  The problems of plasma infusion 
and improper suture techniques were further complicated by the fact that the Medical 
                                                            
2 Albert E. Cowdrey, Fighting for Life: American Military Medicine in World War II (New York: The Free 
Press, 1994), 153-158. 
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Corps had arrived in the theater without plans for a working medical evacuation route.  
The wounded were moved to the rear in an ad hoc manner that complicated their 
recovery and slowed evacuation.  Casualties arrived at the aid stations and hospitals 
without records documenting the medical attention they had received causing further 
chaos.  Perrin Long, the American developer of sulfonamides as well as a surgical 
consultant, commented on the American Army Medical Corps’s utter lack of an 
evacuation plan.  Long stated that “…there had been no attempt to examine, much less to 
formulate, policies for the management of the wounded.  Surgical policies were all at 
loose ends.”3 As was seen in the surgical policies on sutures and anti-bacterials, the 
American Army failed to carry over into the World War II the lessons learned in the 
Great War.   
The evacuation plan developed in the World War I planned for the removal of the 
wounded from the battle lines to the general hospitals in the rear. Lt. Col. Jay W. 
Grissinger, the Chief Surgeon for the 42nd Division, First Corps, 3rd Army of the 
American Expeditionary Force, described this process in his 1927 article, “The 
Development of Military Medicine.”  Grissinger stated that 
Professional care of a soldier who becomes a casualty on the battlefield begins as 
soon as he falls into the hands of the medical department representatives who 
search the field for wounded.  Naturally, however, treatment in the field and 
during evacuation must be confined to first aid until the patient arrives at an 
evacuation hospital. Here many operations are performed but prolonged treatment 
can be furnished only by organizations in the Zone of the Interior, far removed 
from the noise and stress of combat, namely, in the general hospitals.4   
 
                                                            
3 Quoted in Edward E. Churchill, Surgeon to Soldiers: Diary and Records of the Surgical Consultant, 
Allied Force Headquarters, World War II (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1972), 82. 
4 Jay W. Grissinger, “The Development of Military Medicine,” Bulletin of the New York Academy of 
Medicine 3 (1927): 353. 
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Grissinger describes that when soldiers fell on the battlefield, stretcher bearers carried 
the non-walking casualties to the battalion aid stations located 500 yards from the front 
lines.  Casualties were then taken from the battalion aid station to the collection station, 
the furthest point forward that ambulances could traverse.  Ambulances carried the 
casualties to the hospital stations where the physicians examined the wounded and those 
needing urgent surgery were taken to the adjacent surgical hospital where surgeons 
mended all wounds needing immediate repair.  Medical aides took the less severely 
injured to the Evacuation Hospitals or even the general hospitals in the Communication 
Zone.  Once casualties reached the general hospitals, they would be out of the reach of 
the artillery fire from the front.  Here, the wounded received the corrective surgeries 
whereas earlier in the evacuation line, surgeons administered only the most basic 
lifesaving surgeries. 
Such an evacuation line offered the wounded soldiers the best chance at a full 
recovery whereas the individualistic approach pursued early in Mediterranean Theater 
promoted dangerous surgical techniques.  In this approach, a surgeon took responsibility 
for all casualty operating procedures, including preventive and definitive surgical care.  
Unlike in an evacuation line, where such responsibilities are spread out among the 
stations, the casualty’s life became the responsibility of that particular surgeon, a liability 
that the surgeon was not equipped to handle.  Churchill blamed this individualistic 
approach on the age old idea that surgeons should strive to be “heroes.”  Churchill 
observed this concept in the armored division of the II Corps where the physicians 
employed half-tracks with a shelf bolted to the back.  Surgeons intended this vehicle to be 
a mobile operating room for surgery under any conditions.  Churchill condemned this 
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concept for not taking into account the welfare of the patients after the operation.  Who 
and how were these patients to be taken care of after their operations as they would not 
be fit to travel long distances?  Churchill attributed such philosophies to the concept that 
surgeons are trained heroes, an idea that stated that a surgeon should strive by heroic acts 
to care for the wounded and do whatever necessary to heal the casualty, an idea that often 
had disastrous consequences.  Medical philosophy promoted the idea of surgical heroics 
throughout the early 20th century.  Physician Charles Dana laid out the heroic standards to 
which young surgeons were to strive in his 1927 article, “How Young Doctors Should 
Behave.”  Dana stated that “Heroism is certainly a commendable thing…Heroism 
invalues courage, skill, daring, and initiative.  It seems that all these qualities are needed, 
or maybe employed in the career you have chosen.”5   Through such indoctrinations, the 
young surgeons serving in the World War II felt it their duty to be heroic surgeons.  
However, surgical heroics did not fit into the Army’s medical plan though the Army itself 
had little idea of how to approach medical care.   
As the American Army moved into North Africa in November 1942, the 
American system of surgical organization fell apart.  The Army Medical Corps 
compensated by superimposing the British evacuation and medical care system over its 
own.  As Churchill pointed out, the British physicians were experienced in wartime 
medical care, but lacked the manpower and equipment of the Americans.  Heneage 
Ogilive, Chief Surgical Consultant for the Royal Army Medical Corps, wrote a guideline 
for the British and American Medical Corps in order to synchronize both forces.  
However, the Royal Army Medical Corps was not always as well adjusted to battlefield 
                                                            
5 Charles L. Dana, “How Young Doctors Should Behave,” Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine 
3(1927): 650. 
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medicine as they appeared to the Americans moving into North Africa.  The British 
began with a spotty evacuation system.  The Royal Medical Corps did not have a set 
system of which patients to keep for further surgery and so chose the patients 
inconsistently.  At the casualty clearing station, the second stop in the evacuation line, the 
British operated on the casualties as soon as possible no matter when the patient had to be 
moved as they wanted to evacuate all patients except those in the worst condition 24 
hours after surgery.  They also employed mobile surgical units with vehicles built as 
mobile operating rooms.  Churchill criticized the British system of “surgery on wheels” 
as well as the early evacuation of all casualties from the casualty clearing station.  He 
stated that such a system focused on quantity and not quality.  Instead, the surgeons at the 
front should give their patients the same care as they would under normal conditions as 
the treatment in the forward area determined how the patients would recover.  Churchill 
stated that “By the time the patient reaches the base, the subsequent course of the injury 
is largely determined.”6  He further intimated that all surgeries at the front should be 
limited to the severely injured and those on whom surgery had been performed were to be 
held at their current hospital until they were fit for travel.  Ogilvie also criticized the 
Royal Army for how surgeons were placed in the field.  He stated that “…they are looked 
on as flags on the map…often far from real surgical work.  Recognition of their value 
lends to their being sent where they are not much more than supporters of morale or 
divisional mascots.”7 Churchill evaluated the Royal Army Medical Corps’s initial 
performance in the Mediterranean by stating that “The same elements repeat themselves: 
                                                            
6 Surgeon to Soldiers, 95. 
7 “Abstract of tour report of the Consultant Surgeon on visits to 1st Army, 8th Army, and Lines of 
Communication, Brigadier General W.H. Ogilvie,”1 May 1943, Box 34, Folder 1, Francis A. Countway 
Library of Medicine, Boston, MA. 
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the lack of planning at the outset, the need to bring surgery forward and the necessity for 
mobility weighed against the cold surgical fact proper resuscitation and post-operative 
care are of importance equal to the operation itself in determining whether a wounded 
man will survive.”8  These were the examples that the Americans had to follow when 
they entered the theater no matter how critical Churchill was of them.  
 Friction between the Army commanders and medical corps led to further 
problems with proper execution of medical care.  Churchill pointed out that the 
commanders felt the Medical Corps more of a hindrance and an inconvenience than 
helpful.9  Medical Corps members not only had to keep up functioning medical practices, 
but also work to appease the commanders over them.  Churchill felt the relationship 
between the two important as the Medical Corps physicians were to give the Army 
commanders advice on the medical risk they took when planning maneuvers on the 
battlefield.  However, much of this advice fell on deaf ears as Army commanders gave 
their own recommendations for the best care of the wounded.  General George S. Patton 
stated in his 6 January 1943 speech that “If you have two wounded soldiers, one with a 
gunshot wound of the lung, and other with an arm or a leg blown off, you save the 
sonofabitch with the lung wound and let the goddamn sonofabitch with an amputated arm 
or leg to hell.  He is no goddamn use to us anymore.”10  Without support from the higher 
ranking members of the American Army and no plan for the proper evacuation and care 
for the wounded, the Army Medical Corps faced major challenges in the Mediterranean 
Theater.   
                                                            
8 Surgeon to Soldiers, 98. 
9 Ibid, 89. 
10 Quoted in Albert E. Cowdrey, Fighting  for Life: American Military Medicine in World War II (New 
York: The Free Press, 1994), 118. 
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 While on tour of the hospitals in Tunisia, Churchill became intimately acquainted 
with the II Corps medical services, which demonstrated the bad shape that the American 
Medical Corps found themselves in.  Previously, the II Corps took on the Germans in the 
Battle of Kasserine Pass without an adequately staffed medical unit.  Fortunately, 
additional medical troops did arrive, but during the heat of battle.  The addition of 
physicians only contributed to the confusion in the hospital wards as the individual 
physicians treated each casualty according to their own interpretation of the wounds.  
Clearing stations closer to the front faced further mayhem as they were understaffed and 
stocked with faulty equipment.  These surgeons received little guidance from the Army 
Medical Corps as to how to perform their duties.  Churchill stated that “They [clearing 
station physicians] were relying on the advice they could get from the evacuation 
hospitals behind.”11  Two months after the Battle of Kasserine Pass, Churchill found the 
conditions of the II Corps medical service unchanged.  He reported in his 16 April 1943 
Memorandum on Surgery in the II Corps that the aid stations at the front frequently 
attempted to perform definitive surgery with disastrous results.  Additionally, the aid 
station physicians failed to record what treatment they gave to each patient.  Churchill 
found similar results at the clearing stations.  Here, the doctors were prepared to perform 
definitive surgeries, but lacked x-ray machines as well as post-operation treatment 
centers.  Because they lacked the post-operation treatment centers, the surgeons were 
responsible for the stream of wounded men flowing into the station as well as the post 
operation care of those already operated on, a stress the physicians were not equipped to 
handle.   
                                                            
11 Ibid, 86. 
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The lack of small evacuation hospitals meant that some mobile surgical units 
would be used for purposes for which they were never intended.   Surgical Hospital #48, 
intended as a mobile surgical unit, became used as an evacuation hospital because the II 
Corps lacked small 400 bed evacuation hospitals.  The unit performed 455 debridement 
surgeries in March 1943 as well as 741 other surgical procedures, a feat that the 
personnel and equipment were not designed to handle.12  Surgery at Surgical Hospital 
#48 became an assembly line without distinction between the initial primary surgery and 
definitive surgery, a treatment normally performed in the evacuation or base hospitals.  
The assembly line strategy passed the wounded through many extra hands, which 
resulted in infection and wounds that were difficult to heal as well as slowed down the 
evacuation process.  Also, physicians often failed to record the medical treatment and 
medication given to each of the casualties under these stressful circumstances.  Thus, 
when the patient reached the next station or hospital in the evacuation line, the doctors 
did not know what treatments the patient had previously received.  Churchill found that 
few emergency tags, labels attached to each soldier’s clothing recording their medical 
history in the evacuation line, were missing.  The doctors simply did not fill them out or 
dirt or blood made them illegible further complicating the already strained evacuation 
line. Brigadier General W.H. Ogilvie, British surgical consultant and vice president of the 
Royal College of Surgeons, stated of the American evacuation line: “Your problem 
seems as difficult as it could be.  For all the skill you have available, your lines of 
evacuation are so complex and your hospitals so scattered along them that to segregate 
                                                            
12 “Memorandum on Surgery in the II Corps,” 16 April 1943, Edward Churchill Papers, Box 35, Folder 14, 
Francis A. Countway Library of Medicine, Boston, MA. 
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special cases with any degree of completeness seems an impossible achievement.”13 
Churchill knew that a more organized system must replace the ad hoc scheme used in 
North Africa up to this point.14  
 Instead, Churchill implemented a system of medical evacuation utilized in the 
Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939 by Douglas W. Jolly.  Jolly, a British citizen, 
volunteered for service in the Republican Army and was given command of a mobile 
surgical unit from November 1936 to December 1938.  Jolly and the other members of 
the Republican Army Medical Corps were forced to structure their units from scratch as 
most of the Republican doctors defected to the Nationalist cause.  To make the most of 
their small medical corps, the Republican Army developed a highly organized medical 
evacuation system.  Jolly stated that “To ensure a service of field surgery to its large and 
growing army in all varying phases in the total war in which it was engaged, Republican 
Spain evolved the Three-Point Forward System, based on the self-sufficient mobile 
surgical unit.”15  This system spread out the responsibility for the wounded among the 
stations and hospitals, ultimately providing better surgical care and a better managed 
evacuation chain.  Jolly explained that the Republican Army needed a medical evacuation 
system that would eliminate the gathering of wounded in any one place as this would 
invite aerial bombardment from the enemy.  To accomplish this, the medical corps 
needed to split up into its functional elements.  Casualty Clearing Stations would be 
divided into a casualty classification post, Number 1 Hospital for the most urgent 
                                                            
13 “Quoted in Edward D. Churchill’s Annual Report of Consulting Surgeon to Surgeon, NATOUSA,” 2 
July 1943, Edward Churchill Papers, Box 35, Folder 15, Francis A. Countway Library of Medicine, 
Boston, MA.   
14 “Memorandum on Surgery in the II Corps,” 16 April 1943, Edward Churchill Papers, Box 35, Folder 14, 
Francis A. Countway Library of Medicine, Boston, MA.  
15 Douglas W. Jolly, Field Surgery in Total War (New York: Paul B. Hoeber, Inc., 1941), xii. 
 68 
 
wounded, and the Number 2 Hospital for the less urgent casualties with other functional 
elements in between.  This system reduced the number of stations and hands through 
which the wounded passed, especially on the front line.  Jolly stressed that multiple posts 
meant that the wounded passed through a multitude of hands and received many 
unnecessary dressing changes.  Jolly stated that “Innumerable sufferers in every war have 
been bandaged to their grave at the hand of over enthusiastic dressers.”16  Such a system 
provided a stable environment for evacuation of the wounded.  
 However, not all agreed with Jolly’s principle of evacuation.  Tudor Hart, Jolly’s 
contemporary, stated that the wounded must be removed from the front as rapidly as 
could be allowed and that “…absolutely nothing must be allowed to interrupt the flow of 
casualties to the rear, even if this means some loss of lives that might have been saved 
under peace time working conditions.”17  Jolly stated that the evacuation system did not 
have to mean the death of numerous wounded for the sake of speed.  Instead, division of 
the responsibilities among the functional elements would provide a speedy evacuation 
system that would give the wounded a fair chance at survival.  
In Jolly’s evacuation plan, medical aides took the wounded soldiers to the 
battalion aid post immediately behind the front lines.  At the battalion aid post, the 
patients received treatment for any immediately life threatening conditions such as 
hemorrhage after which the physicians readied the casualty for transport.  Physicians also 
attached a field casualty card to the patient’s clothing.  This card would be used to record 
the treatments the patient received throughout the evacuation line.  Litter bearers took the 
wounded to the classification post one to four miles behind the front once the patient was 
                                                            
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid, 21. 
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readied for transport.  Here, Jolly stressed the importance of keeping the wounded from 
accumulating at the classification post as such an occurrence would invite enemy air 
bombardment.  At the classification post, physicians determined the types of wounds the 
casualties had received and whether or not these wounds were life threatening.  Jolly 
stated that “It cannot be too often stated that the working of the Three Point Forward 
System depends on an early and exact classification of the wounded.”18  Elimination of 
this classification step could result in the severely wounded not receiving the lifesaving 
surgery they required. The classification post gave blood transfusions to the men in 
shock, a proposition ahead of its time, splinted or re-splinted legs, and removed 
tourniquets.  Next, ambulances took the most seriously wounded to the Number 1 
Hospital or the Forward Hospital for further treatment while the less seriously wounded 
were moved to the Evacuation Hospitals.   
   Physicians at the Number 1 Hospital or Forward Hospital were responsible for 
arresting severe hemorrhage as well as mending severe abdominal, chest, and head 
wounds as well as all cases of severe skin or tissue destruction.  The Number 2 Hospital 
dealt with all other casualties except for the most trivial, which physicians sent on to the 
Evacuation Hospital.  Jolly stated that the Number 1 hospital should be as near the front 
as possible without compromising the safety of the patients.  He insisted that this position 
must be within five hours travel from the classification station.   When Jolly reduced the 
time lag between the classification post and the forward hospital for abdominal patients 
from 10 to 5 hours, he saw recovery rates improve from 30 to 57 percent.  He also 
insisted that the forward hospital must be in a location where the patients could be kept 
for eight or more days after their procedure.   Patients recently operated on needed these 
                                                            
18 Ibid, 23. 
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days of rest as post operation patients could not withstand further transport immediately 
following surgery.  The reduction in time lag as well as a rest period for the post 
operation patients meant a better overall recovery.   
 Churchill planned to use Jolly’s evacuation system with some modification to 
bring order and unity to the chaotic medical evacuation line seen in North Africa.  He 
introduced the first modification to Jolly’s system at the clearing station.  When the litter 
bearers arrived with the wounded at the clearing station, doctors immediately sorted them 
according to the severity of their wounds.  Physicians sent the severely wounded on to the 
field hospital and all others to the evacuation hospital.  Instead of re-splinting the 
wounded and preparing the wounds for further transportation, Churchill stationed field 
hospital platoons at the clearing station, which allowed the severely wounded to be 
transported the field hospital immediately by stretcher.  Churchill stated that “No pause is 
required for resuscitation of interference with splinting or dressings.  Expert surgical 
management that embraces resuscitation, operation, and prolonged post-operative care, 
becomes immediately available.”19  He further stated that the surgeons and physicians at 
the field hospital must be the most thorough of all the Army surgeons in order to save life 
and limb. He stated that “Initial surgery cannot be carried on as a hasty, slap-dash and 
bloody spectacle, with rapid evacuation of the patient to the rear if satisfactory results are 
to be achieved.”20  Surgical expertise at the forward hospital also acted as a morale 
booster as well as improved the medical procedures performed in other sectors.  Splinting 
at aid stations was improved and the clearing and collection companies were less likely to 
take on comprehensive “heroic” surgeries with a hospital of experts so near the front.  
                                                            
19 Ibid.  
20 Edward D. Churchill, “Surgical Management of the Wounded at the Time of the Fall of Rome,” Annals 
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Still, Churchill pointed out, these forward hospitals only care for a fraction of the 
wounded with the evacuation hospital in the rear bearing most of the burden.  Churchill 
stated that “These institutions [evacuation hospitals], with trained experienced 
professional staffs have attained a high degree of proficiency in the procedures of initial 
wound management and remain the backbone of the Army Medical Service.”21 From the 
initial wound care at the aid station to the evacuation hospital, Churchill’s use of Jolly’s 
Spanish Civil War plan brought the much needed organization to the Mediterranean 
medical evacuation plan.  Churchill stated that “This principle of triage based on the 
urgency of the wound with separate hospitalization for the two categories of cases 
subsequently became the basic principle followed by the US Medical Corps in World 
War II.”22  Such a system would allow the army to continue its fight and the medical 
corps to continue its lifesaving mission.   
 When the Germans and Italians retreated to Sicily, the American ground troops 
planned their invasion of the island called Operation Husky, while the Medical Corps 
prepared for the invasion.  In the month before the invasion, Churchill reiterated the 
importance of the lessons learned in North Africa about the importance of an organized 
medical evacuation system.  The 9 June 1943 Circular Letter Number 16 reminded 
surgeons if they did not have the proper aftercare facilities the casualties should be 
evacuated instead.  The letter also reminded physicians to limit the heroics of their 
surgical techniques and that initial surgery was intended for infection prevention and 
transportability only.23   
                                                            
21 Ibid, 272. 
22 Surgeon to Soldiers, 92. 
23 Ibid, 211. 
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 The medical corps prepped for the invasion of Sicily by examining the types of 
wounds seen in North Africa and estimating the number of wounded in the Sicilian 
Campaign based on these figures.  The medical corps also spread hospitals out along the 
coast of North Africa ready to receive the wounded from Sicily.  Churchill stated that “I 
tried to get a system established to sort the wounded as they came back from Sicily and 
distribute them among these hospitals.”24  He also helped set up specialty centers.  These 
centers housed expert surgeons prepared to handle the most difficult cases in their 
particular field, the most important being neurosurgery, a weakness in the North African 
Campaign.  As the day of invasion approached, Churchill continually toured the North 
African coast, inspecting the hospitals prepared for the invasion.   During this time he 
used the beaches on Bizerte and Tunis to set up a mass triage station where the wounded 
from Sicily would be immediately evacuated from the island and be sorted for 
distribution to the various hospitals on the North African Coast.  These preparations 
along with their experience in North Africa, the medical corps felt ready for the invasion 
of Sicily.  
 Operation Husky commenced on 11 July 1943.  This invasion and the subsequent 
march across Sicily proved confusing and complicated for the members of the medical 
corps.  The evacuation plan Churchill devised in North Africa was still in effect, but 
different terrain and tactical situations called for major modifications.  In his Tour Report 
of the Sicilian Campaign on 19 August 1943, Churchill stated that an evacuation plan 
based on days had become impossible to keep in the forward hospitals.  He stated that 
“The rapidly changing tactical situation as well as the need to constantly move hospitals 
forward in support of the combat divisions requires evacuation from the corps to be 
                                                            
24 Ibid, 214. 
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defined in terms of transportability rather than days of expected disability.” 25  He further 
stated that the evacuation line should not be stalled because of the stated number of days 
for the casualties to recover.  The mountainous terrain added to the difficulties.  
Evacuation across the flat terrain of the North African deserts had not prepared the 
medical corps for evacuating patients across the Sicilian mountains.  Churchill gave an 
example of such difficulties stating that “One patient was moved by a nine hour litter 
carry that required 50 different litter bearers.”26  Litter bearers evacuated most casualties 
in no less than 5 to 6 hours.  As shown in North Africa, long and arduous evacuations 
served to irritate the casualties’ wounds.  Thus, physicians kept casualties facing difficult 
journeys at the aid station for 24 hours, giving their wounds time to rest.  The medical 
corps further improvised by using pack mules to evacuate the slightly wounded as well as 
jeeps with two litters attached to them. The mountainous terrain not only complicated the 
evacuation process but also placed level land at a premium, thus the forward hospitals 
and stations fought with other army installations for this land, such as ammunition 
dumps, ordinance installations, and air strips.   
 The mountainous terrain was not the only problematic entity.  The members of the 
medical corps themselves proved difficult to manage. Though the medical corps 
discovered that the Sicilian terrain was intrinsically more difficult to traverse than in 
North Africa, as Churchill stated, the evacuation system he had set up in North Africa 
would still work in Sicily albeit with modifications.  Medical corps members from the 
litter bearers all the way to the surgeons had been informed of the evacuation plan, but 
many dispensed with the casualties as they saw fit causing great chaos in the line of 
                                                            
25 “Tour Report of Sicilian Campaign,” 19 August 1943, Edward Churchill Papers, Box 35, Folder 17, 
Francis A. Countway Library of Medicine, Boston, MA.   
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evacuation.  Churchill’s fellow surgical consultant, Frank Berry, observed that his 
hospital repeatedly received large numbers of unsorted casualties.  Berry stated that the 
ambulances dropped off the wounded wherever they saw fit and did not attempt to move 
them to the correct hospital. Churchill observed that “No one seems to be really 
interested in the prompt and proper evacuation of the patient nor to have the adequate 
authority and cooperation to accomplish it smoothly.” 27  Instead, he moved to have a unit 
put in place to oversee the evacuation process.  This group would divide the evacuation 
line into sectors with a supervisor over each sector.  He stated that this unit’s intimate 
knowledge of the evacuation system would make sure that the operation ran smoothly.   
 Following several tours of the Sicilian hospitals, Churchill returned to Algiers to 
reflect on the problems encountered in the campaign.  Unlike the North African 
Campaign, in Sicily the elements of the Army Medical Corps frequently moved and 
operated under fire. Churchill stated that “…the military intensity of this campaign in part 
accounts for some of the weakness in the evacuation procedures…”28  He recommended 
that in fighting such as the medical corps saw in Sicily, the medical corps should be 
under the command of the Corps instead of the Army.  Under the command of the Corps, 
the various hospitals would react quicker to the constantly changing tactical situations.  
Each consultant in the field also needed to become an expert in the line of evacuation in 
order to advise units in the field.  Churchill stressed the need for cooperation between the 
elements of the evacuation line because without the medical corps working as a team, the 
evacuation line would become a hodgepodge scheme as has been seen in the early days in 
North African.   
                                                            
27 Surgeon to Soldiers, 216. 
28 Ibid.  
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 Churchill did not write much about the troubles with the evacuation line after his 
involvement in Sicily.  However, one can see from Tregaskis’ example in Fighting for 
Life, that Churchill’s evacuation plan worked despite the difficulties experienced in 
Sicily.  Churchill’s implementation of Jolly’s medical evacuation plan from the Spanish 
Civil War brought much needed order to the medical evacuation line in North Africa.  
The Army Medical Corps failed to enact a working evacuation plan before the start of the 
campaign, causing chaos.  Physicians and surgeons acted as individuals instead of as a 
team, which left the burden of the patient’s care in the hands of one surgeon, an 
encumbrance the surgeon was not equipped to handle.  Furthermore, the stages of surgery 
were not yet divided out among the stations and hospitals meaning that initial and 
definitive surgery could take place simultaneously.  This approach led to infections and 
left the patient un-transportable for a long period of time.  Churchill’s implementation of 
Jolly’s evacuation plan solved both of these problems by dividing up the responsibility of 
care for the casualties among the stations and hospitals in the evacuation line.  He divided 
the hospitals into their most basic elements, spreading the care for the casualties among 
several stations and hospitals, relieving physicians of the burden of complete care for the 
patients. This stable evacuation plan afforded the casualties a reduced evacuation time as 
well as better quality medical care.  However, the evacuation plan failed to reach its full 
potential during the Sicilian Campaign.  Despite these shortcomings, mostly because of 
improper use of the evacuation line and difficulties with the Sicilian terrain, Churchill’s 
evacuation plan provided a stable strategy to remove the wounded to safety through a 
system stations and hospitals that proved successful overall.   
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Chapter VI 
EPILOGUE  
 Colonel Edward Delos Churchill’s medical work and oversight in the 
Mediterranean Theater of World War II transformed the medical care in the theater from 
unorganized and inexperienced to stream lined and state of the art care.  When Churchill 
entered the theater in 1942, the Army Medical Corps, mostly made up of civilian 
draftees, had little to no experience with military medicine.   This problem resulted in the 
use of faulty medical information that led to life threatening problems such as plasma use 
and improper debridement.  Churchill realized the depth of these problems and worked to 
correct these follies, which resulted in a Medical Corps well versed in military medicine.  
These lessons learned in the Mediterranean Theater echoed throughout the whole of the 
Medical Corps in the European and Pacific Theaters.  The hard lessons learned in North 
Africa, Sicily, and Italy resulted in safer medical practices that saved more lives 
throughout the United States’ involvement in World War II.   
 Perhaps Churchill’s most far reaching contribution was clarifying the definition of 
“shock” and instituting the use of whole blood instead of plasma to reverse shock during 
hemorrhage.  Defining shock had continued from World War I as a major problem.  
Physicians in the early 20th century attributed shock to absurd causes such as over-
breathing.  Through the World War I and into the early stages of the World War II, the 
concept of shock was divided into three distinct albeit erroneous phases.  The first phase 
consisted of primary shock, which initiated from the initial blood loss after wounding.  
Next, the casualty entered secondary shock.  Physicians stated that casualties entered this 
stage sometime after injury and could be characterized by weakness and low blood 
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pressure.  If not arrested, shock could lead into “irreversible shock,” which was a 
condition from which no one could recover.  Additionally, the the general consensus 
among army physicians was that shock was caused by hemoconcentration, a condition in 
which the red blood cells concentrated in the blood stream after plasma, the liquid in 
which blood was suspended, had escaped the body.  Therefore, under this definition, 
physicians treated shock with plasma, which instead of helping served to suffocate the 
patients as the red blood cells lost were not replaced.  Churchill condemned these 
teachings as flawed and stated that shock was caused by hemodilution, a condition that 
occurs when both red blood cells and plasma are lost during hemorrhage and the only 
cure is an infusion of whole blood.  However, the cure was easier said than done as the 
army had yet to create a way to transport whole blood into the field.  Churchill solved this 
problem by creating a system of local blood collection and implementing preserving 
methods.  This ensured that casualties had a greater chance at survival.   
 Simultaneously Churchill also battled the problem of the overuse of the 
antibacterial drug sulfonamides instead of proper debridement and surgical techniques.  
This “miracle drug” caused a great stir in the states and was hailed as the only cure for 
bacterial infection.  After army physicians saw what they determined as good results from 
the drug following the attack on Pearl Harbor, sulfonamides were added to the arsenal of 
medical cures.  In the Mediterranean Theater, physicians filled wounds with the 
sulfonamides, which only served to cause further major infections.  Churchill instead 
proved that surgeons needed to debride wounds if they were to heal properly.  By 
debriding the wounds, physicians removed dead tissues and foreign objects from the 
wounds, thus removing the breeding ground for bacteria that could cause major 
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infections.  Physicians also needed to wait to close the wound in order to ensure that all 
foreign materials had indeed been removed.  Churchill suggested 4 to 10 days, a time he 
labeled as “the golden period.”  Each of these steps ensured a better healing wound and 
fewer complication for the doctors throughout the evacuation chain.   
 Churchill’s third major accomplishment as the chief surgical consultant of the 
Mediterranean Theater was the implementation of an organized medical evacuation line, 
which guaranteed the safe removal and care  of casualties from the battlefield to general 
hospitals in the rear.  Initially, the Medical Corps lacked an evacuation line and the 
medical aides and physicians on hand removed the casualties from the front however was 
seen fit.  Haphazard removal from the battlefields led to major complications for the 
casualties such as infection as well as the undoing of all previous surgery because of 
rough travels and no rest period between periods of travel.  Churchill, in order to fix this 
problem, implemented a plan devised by Douglas Jolly in the Spanish Civil War in which 
the removal of patients from the front was enhanced by an organized system that gave 
each station along the evacuation route set standards that each were to implement.  This 
system staggered surgical care and eliminated the problem of heroic surgery.  Casualties 
were no longer subjected to haphazard surgery and instead encountered a smooth running 
evacuation line that ensured them quality medical care.   
 The principles that Churchill established in the Mediterranean Theater not only 
helped heal those in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, but also spread to the European and 
Pacific Theaters.  While confusion may have reigned early on in both theaters, the 
established medical findings of the Mediterranean Theater shortened the period of 
confusion greatly.  This can be best seen in the use of whole blood in the European 
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Theater.  The European Theater proved more bureaucratically complicated and 
problematic than the Mediterranean.  Here, blood had to be flown over the Channel and 
bad weather often complicated its delivery.  The fact that the European Theater was made 
up of five different armies caused problems because the surgical heads of each army all 
had different interpretations of how to use whole blood.  Despite these problems, the 
Chief Surgeon of the European Theater had been kept informed by the National Research 
Council about the developments in other theaters on whole blood, blood substitutes, and 
shock.  He also received all of the reports from the Mediterranean Theater about blood 
use.  So impressed by these findings, the Chief Surgeon sent several of his staff  to the 
Mediterranean Theater to learn more about blood use first hand.  Likewise, several 
members of the unit responsible for the Mediterranean Theater blood bank visited Europe 
before the invasion.  As Douglas Kendrick, head of the blood transfusion program in 
World War II stated, “They had much to contribute for the Mediterranean Theater had 
been an active theater of operations for 2 ½ years before operations in Europe.”1   
 However, the inexperienced surgeons in the European Theater were bound to 
make mistakes.   For example, following the 6 June 1944 invasion, the 1st and 3rd Armies 
only had access to a limited supply of whole blood and conserved what they could for the 
most severely injured patients.  It was not until 13 August 1944 that the Surgeon General 
agreed to send whole blood to the U.S. troops in Europe.2 Later, when these armies had 
access to adequate blood supplies, they continued to conserve blood.  Thus the biggest 
lesson for the European Theater was the fact that the casualties had to be given blood in 
                                                            
1 Brigadier General Douglas B. Kendrick, Blood Program in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Office of 
the Surgeon General, 1964), 460. 
2 Douglas B. Kendrick, Memoirs of a Twentieth-Century Army Surgeon (Manhattan: Sunflower University 
Press,  
1992), 89. 
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large quantities.  Kendrick states that “…these lessons were well learned is evident in the 
fact…that in the last months of the war in the European Theater, as in the Mediterranean 
Theater, the ratio of units of blood to wounded men was close to 1:1.”3  
 The European Theater also learned about the great success that the Mediterranean 
Theater had with proper surgical techniques such as debridement, but the lessons came 
too late for use in the 6 June invasion.  Mather Cleveland, author of Orthopedic Surgery 
in the European Theater states that “It was not until late spring 1944, only a few weeks 
before D-Day in the European Theater that delayed primary wound closure [that] was 
also adopted in the Mediterranean Theater… and lack of time as well as lack of liaison, 
prevented the general dissemination of the information in the European Theater.”4  The 
European Theater did experience the same problems as the Mediterranean Theater but on 
a much smaller scale.  The surgeons here had the advantage of the “Manual of Therapy,” 
which laid out the steps for proper surgery as well as the experience of the surgeons in 
the Mediterranean Theater to build on.  Following the 6 June invasion, confusion caused 
major problems with surgery in the forward areas as the surgeons here were 
inexperienced and new.  However, in a few weeks when calm was restored, physicians 
again relied on proven surgical methods of the Mediterranean Theater.   
 Churchill’s methods also extended to the Pacific Theater.  The Pacific Theater’s 
blood program proved an organizational miracle as the whole blood supply had to travel 
from the mainland to the islands.  In the beginning, the blood supply came from Australia 
and later on from the mainland.  The adequate supply of blood mainly came from the 
organizational skills of the blood distribution center on Guam.  As Douglas Kendrick 
                                                            
3 Blood Program in World War II, 460. 
4 John Boyd Coates and Mather Cleveland, Orthopedic Surgery in the European Theater (Washington 
D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, 1956), 82. 
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pointed out “In one operation out of four, said the May 1945 report of the distribution 
center at Guam in reference to the early stages of the Okinawa Operation, ‘we had too 
much [blood] too early but in none, including the other phases of the Okinawa Operation, 
to date did we ever have too little, too late.’”5  Douglas Kendrick, the head of the Army 
Blood Transfusion Program and blood transfusion officer for the 10th Army in the 
Pacific, stated that the principles that Churchill advocated in the Mediterranean Theater 
transposed themselves onto the Pacific.  Furthermore, the Pacific proved that blood could 
be collected from the Zone of the Interior and moved for use in even the most remote 
Pacific island.  Again, this movement is a tribute to Churchill’s innovations as he helped 
pioneer preservation methods to move whole blood over long distances.   
 Douglas Kendrick further imparted the lessons he learned from his work with 
Churchill by presenting the surgical techniques of the Mediterranean Theater to the 10th 
Army consultants.  Together, the consultants and Kendrick planned a speaking tour 
across the medical establishments of the 10th Army.  Kendrick stated “The consultants of 
the 10th Army conceded that this most recent information from combat trained physicians 
and surgeons played a tremendous part in the respectable results obtained by the medical 
services in Okinawa.”6  Another author, Emile Holman, former Chief Surgeon of the 
Mare Island Naval Hospital, promoted Churchill’s proven principles.  While Holman did 
advocate the use of sulfonamides in the Pacific, he declared that proper excision was an 
equally important step.  In his article “Experience with Chest Wounds from the Pacific 
Combat Area,” Holman compared two identical chest wounds, one that received proper 
debridement and one that did not.  Holman stated that “Although these two injuries were 
                                                            
5 Blood Program in World War II, 638. 
6 Douglas B. Kendrick, MD, Memoirs of a Twentieth-Century Army Surgeon (Manhattan: Sunflower 
University Press, 1992), 102. 
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almost identically located, and presented exactly similar effects, the one in whom 
immediate excision was performed recovered, while the other, in whom immediate 
excision was not performed, died…”7  The work by these two men proves the fact that 
Churchill’s surgical principles enable the Pacific to better care for its casualties and less 
time figuring out the best way to do so.   
 Edward Churchill’s achievements during his tenure as the Chief Surgical 
Consultant of the Mediterranean Theater brought about major changes in the 
Mediterranean Theater and beyond.  His medical knowledge and skills enabled him to 
deduce solutions to problems in the theater such as plasma use and misguided surgical 
techniques.  Equally as important was his position as the surgical consultant through 
which he synchronized medical practices in the theater.  Standardization allowed for 
consistent medical care for all casualties as well as eased the physician’s burden as he 
knew what to expect in the casualties coming into his ward from the front.  Further, 
regulation of the medical practices allowed for the implementation of whole blood use in 
the Mediterranean Theater to happen sooner than it would have otherwise.  Widespread 
whole blood use may have eventually happened in the Mediterranean Theater, but 
Churchill ensured that it happened quickly and effectively.  However, other principles 
such as an organized evacuation route and proper surgical techniques may not have 
materialized without Churchill.  These technical procedures spread to both the European 
and Pacific theaters, creating an informed medical corps better equipped to care for 
casualties.  Thus Edward Churchill’s work as the surgical consultant in the Mediterranean 
                                                            
7 Emile Holman, “Experiences with Chest Wounds from the Pacific Combat Area,” Annals of Surgery 119 
(1944), 3. 
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Theater had far reaching consequences that changed the course of medical care in the war 
and deserves to be remembered.
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